<h4><em>Under review</em></h4>
<p>Legal efforts to address climate change, which is caused by <a href="#greenhouse-gas-emissions">emission of greenhouse gases</a>, started at the <a href="#international-initiatives">international</a> level with the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but have struggled to take root in the United States at the <a href="#federal-greenhouse-gas-efforts">federal</a>, <a href="#state-initiatives">regional and state</a> levels.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Listen to and download materials from the ELI seminar <a href="http://www.eli.org/events/summer-school-climate-change-introduction">Cl… Change: An Introduction</a>. ELI members can listen to ELI’s Monthly <a href="http://www.eli.org/events/monthly-climate-change-briefing-april-2015">C… Change Briefing</a> live or through archived files to follow the latest climate change law, policy, and management developments. For an in-depth discussion of climate change law, see Tom Mounteer, <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press-books/climate-change-deskbook">Climate Change Deskbook</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><a name="greenhouse-gas-emissions"></a>Climate change and greenhouse gas emissions</h3>
<p>Climate change resulting from human activity is one of the most pressing and high-profile environmental issues today. The <a href="http://www.ipcc.ch/&quot; target="_blank">Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</a> (IPCC) drew international attention to climate change in its <a href="http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/wg_I/ipcc_far_wg_I_spm.pdf&quot; target="_blank">1990 Assessment Report</a>, where it reported that increases in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions were causing substantial warming of the Earth’s surface beyond what would naturally occur. The IPCC’s “<a href="http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html&quot; target="_blank">Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change</a>,” released in 2007, stated unequivocally that human activities are <a href="#" title="Moreover, the IPCC found that “Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely [greater than 90% certainty] due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.”">causing</a> an increase in GHG concentrations: “The global increases in carbon dioxide concentration are due primarily to fossil fuel use and land use change, while those of methane and nitrous oxide are primarily due to agriculture.” U.S. government <a href="http://www.globalchange.gov/publications/371&quot; target="_blank">reports</a> concur with this assessment.</p>
<p>For a detailed discussion of the science behind climate change, see <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press-books/reporting-on-climate-change%253A-und… on Climate Change: Understanding the Science, 4<sup>th</sup> ed.</a></p>
<p><img src="/sites/default/files/images/taxonomy-climate-image-1.png" alt="Reconstructed Temperature" title="Reconstructed Temperature" border="0" height="369" width="500"><br>Figure 1 from IPCC Third Assessment. <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:1000_Year_Temperature_Comparison.png"…;
<p>Six main greenhouse gases drive climate change, with the most significant contributor being carbon dioxide. Global Warming Potential (GWP) is a relative measure of the amount of heat that a specific gas traps in the atmosphere over specified time periods.&nbsp; The GWP of carbon dioxide is 1 because it is the baseline unit to which all other gases are compared. Methane has a lifetime <a href="#" title="To really understand how GWPs work, it is important to note that GWP changes depending on the timeframe over which it is calculated. A gas that leaves the atmosphere quickly may have a large short-term warming effect – and thus a high initial GWP - but over the long term the GWP may fall significantly as the gas leaves the atmosphere. The converse is true for GHGs that stay in the atmosphere for a long time. Gases with the highest GWPs both trap a lot of heat and linger in the atmosphere for a long time.">GWP</a> of 12 which means that methane in the atmosphere has 12 times the warming potential as carbon dioxide.</p>
<table style="border-color: #000000; border-width: 1px; border-style: solid; width: 100%;" border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;" rowspan="2">
<p align="center"><strong>GWP values and<br>lifetimes from<br>2007 IPCC<br>Assessment</strong></p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p align="center"><strong>Lifetime</strong></p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;" colspan="3">
<p align="center"><strong>Global Warming Potential Time Horizon</strong></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p align="center"><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p align="center"><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p>
<p align="center"><strong>20 years</strong></p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p align="center"><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p>
<p align="center"><strong>100 years</strong></p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p align="center"><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p>
<p align="center"><strong>500 years</strong></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>Methane</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>12</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>72</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>25</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>7.6</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>Nitrous Oxide</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>114</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>289</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>298</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>153</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>HFC-23&nbsp; (hydrofluorocarbon)</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>270</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>12,000</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>14,800</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>12,200</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>HFC-134a (hydrofluorocarbon)</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>14</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>3,830</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>1,430</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>435</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>Sulfur Hexafluoride</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>3,200</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>16,300</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>22,800</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>32,600</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Adapted from <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/ch2s2-10-2.html">h…;
<p>The human activities in the United States that contribute the largest portion of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere are electric power generation, transportation, industry, agriculture, and commercial buildings.</p>
<p><img src="/sites/default/files/images/taxonomy-climate-image-2.png" alt="Sources of Carbon Dioxide Emissions" title="Sources of Carbon Dioxide Emissions" border="0" height="274" width="500"></p>
<p>From <a href="http://elr.info//news-analysis/40/10547/implementing-behavioral-wedge-d…;
<p>While this list clearly illustrates that addressing greenhouse gas emissions requires efforts in the energy, transportation, building, industrial, and other vital economic sectors, everyday activities of the general population contribute significantly to GHGs as well:</p>
<p><img src="/sites/default/files/images/taxonomy-climate-image-3.png" alt="Sources of Green House Gas Emissions" title="Sources of Green House Gas Emissions" border="0" height="512" width="500"></p>
<p>From <a href="http://elr.info//news-analysis/40/10547/implementing-behavioral-wedge-d…;
<p>Thus, GHG regulation touches the entire economy and everyday choices we all make.</p>
<h3><a name="international-initiatives"></a>International Initiatives</h3>
<p>The <a href="http://unfccc.int/2860.php&quot; target="_blank">United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</a> (UNFCCC) was introduced in 1992 in an effort to control the emission of greenhouse gases that contribute to global climate change. The Convention established several principles for how the international would go about addressing climate change, including the notion that developed countries, who had contributed the most to global warming in the past, had a duty to take the lead in mitigating the adverse effects of climate change, also known as “common but differentiated responsibilities.” The parties to UNFCCC also agreed to develop national greenhouse gas emissions inventories, share scientific research and technology, and help create measures for climate change adaptation. None of these agreements, however, were legally binding.</p>
<p>In December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC established a binding commitment from 37 industrialized nations and the European Community to reduce <a href="#" title="Kyoto covers six greenhouse gases—CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, hydroflourocarbons, perflourocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.">GHG</a> emissions to an average of 5% below 1990 levels during the commitment period 2008 and 2012. These developed nations agreed to meet nation-specific targets to reduce their GHG emissions. In contrast, developing nations, even large developing nations such as India and China, were not required to meet emission reduction targets during this first round and would not be asked to meet emission targets.</p>
<p>In the summer of 1997, before the Kyoto Protocol was agreed to, the U.S. Senate on a 95-0 vote adopted a <a href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-105sres98ats/pdf/BILLS-105sres98ats…; target="_blank">resolution</a> to oppose any treaty that failed to impose similar duties on both developing and developed nations. Despite this vote, the U.S. president, Bill Clinton, signed the Protocol. However, the Protocol was never submitted to the Senate for ratification. By 2001, the United States announced that the Protocol would not be ratified. The Protocol entered into force in the ratifying countries on February 16, 2005.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a discussion of why the United States would not enter into the Kyoto Protocol and issues that constrain U.S. involvement in international efforts against climate change, see the suite of articles including Jody Freeman, “<a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/41/10695/climate-change-and-us-interests"… Change and U.S. Interests</a>” and a <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/41/10726/reply">reply</a&gt; with responses by <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/41/10724/review-freeman-and-guzman%E2%80%… Hopkins</a>, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/41/10720/critiquing-critique-climate-chan… Morgenstern</a>, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/41/10717/response-climate-change-and-us-i… Sheeran</a>, and <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/41/10712/comment-climate-change-and-us-in… Johnson</a> as well as Richard Cooper, “<a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/31/11484/kyoto-protocol-flawed-concept">T… Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept</a>” and Robert Nordhaus, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/30/11061/framework-achieving-environmenta… Framework for Achieving Environmental Integrity and the Economic Benefits of Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Protocol put in place <a href="http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php&quot; target="_blank">three flexibility mechanisms</a> to help member countries reach emissions targets in addition to direct lowering of emissions: <a href="#" title="The emissions trading scheme is similar to the United States’ Clean Air Act Acid Rain Program. Under the Protocol, developed countries have an ‘assigned amount’ of allowable GHG emissions over the commitment period. Parties can buy and sell “assigned amount units” or other types of trading units, each of which correspond to the right to emit one CO2 equivalent ton.">emissions trading</a>, the <a href="#" title="The Protocol created the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which is the primary “offset” framework for helping industrialized countries achieve their reductions. In addition to reducing actual GHG output, industrialized countries can pay developing countries for certified emission reductions generated from projects that reduce GHG emissions in those countries—which is called an offset. CDM projects must show that the reductions achieved are above and beyond any that would otherwise occur—a concept called additionality. In other words, to get credit for reducing emission an investing country has to show the reduction was because of the collaboration and investment from an outside party and that but for that reductions would not have occurred. The CDM has met with significant controversy as implemented to date.">clean development mechanism</a>, and <a href="http://ji.unfccc.int/index.html&quot; title="Joint implementation allows two developed countries to transfer emission reductions.">joint implementation</a>.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a discussion of how offsets might work in the United States, see Kyle Danish, “<a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/40/10610/international-offsets-and-us-cli… Offsets and U.S. Climate Change Legislation</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The first compliance period of the Kyoto Protocol was 2008-2012. At the <a href="http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6825.php&quot; target="_blank">Durban conference of the parties</a>, this was extended. The parties <a href="http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf&quot; target="_blank">agreed</a> to negotiate by 2015 an agreement to take effect not later than 2020 that would involve both developed and developing countries to mitigate climate change and seek to keep global warming no greater than 2ºC.</p>
<p>As part of its effort to implement the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union has implemented perhaps the most advanced emissions trading scheme, the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm&quot; target="_blank">European Trading System</a> (ETS). <a href="#" title="ETS operates in 30 countries (27 EU member states plus the three additional members of the European Economic Area - Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) and applies to carbon dioxide (and some nitrous oxide) emissions from over 10,000 power plants, combustion plants, refineries, metal works and manufacturing facilities. In 2012, the aviation sector was added into the system, and in 2013 additional gases and industries will be added.">Europe’s</a> declared goal is for emissions in 2020 to be 21% lower than in 2005.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a discussion of California’s attempt to link to the ETS, see Hanna Chang, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/37/10771/foreign-affairs-federalism-legal… Affairs Federalism: The Legality of California's Link With the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><a name="federal-greenhouse-gas-efforts"></a>Federal Greenhouse Gas Efforts</h3>
<p>Congress has made multiple attempts to enact comprehensive greenhouse gas legislation, but so far no bill has passed both legislative houses. The most recent bill, the <a href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr2454eh/pdf/BILLS-111hr2454eh.pd… Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009</a> (H.R. 2545), was passed by the House only to die in the Senate. The Act’s central mechanism was an economy-wide<a href="#" title="What is a Cap-and-Trade and How Does it Work? A GHG cap-and-trade program establishes a market whose goal is to reduce GHG emissions. The “cap” sets a limit on emissions that regulated industries can release into the atmosphere. The amount of this limit is reduced over time thus reducing the total amount of GHG emissions. The “trade” is the market that is created to allow companies to innovate in meeting their emission limit. A company that is able to adopt new mechanisms to come in under their allocated emissions limit can sell their emission credits in the market. A company that is unable to meet their emissions target must purchase credits from the market. In this way, reducing GHG emissions is economically incentivized."> cap-and-trade program</a> for greenhouse gas emissions. Under such a program, a regulatory agency sets a maximum level for annual GHG emissions and distributes emissions allowances for a specified amount of <a href="http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=285">carbon dioxide equivalent</a>. Emitters subject to regulation must then reduce their emissions or acquire enough permits to cover their total output. The Act also included <a href="http://ase.org/resources/american-clean-energy-and-security-act-2009-ti…; target="_blank" title="Renewable Portfolio Standards set enforceable standards that require power providers to obtain energy from renewable sources. For example, in California, the goal is to have power providers in California use renewable energy sources for at least 33% of total power needs by 2020. The RPS works by 1. Setting and enforcing annual renewable energy procurement targets. 2. Approving the renewable energy procurement plans and reviewing renewable energy purchase contracts made by invester-owned utilities (IOUs). 3. Creating standard contract forms and conditions to be used by IOUs in making renewable energy purchases. 4. Determining market price referents (MPRs) for traditional, non-renewable energy sources to serve as benchmarks for pricing renewable energy.">renewable electricity generation standards</a>, a number of energy efficiency incentives, and support to industries that would be particularly affected by GHG regulation. Congress did <a href="http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bill…;, and EPA <a href="http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/ghgrulemaking.html">has implemented</a>, GHG emissions reporting.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a discussion of the Senate bills that addressed climate change, see Kenneth Richards, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/39/10601/comparative-analysis-climate-cha… Analysis of Climate Change Bills in the U.S. Senate</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>For one approach to getting Congress to act on climate, and a <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/40/10757/genius-versus-zombies-address-cl…; to that approach, see Richard Lazarus, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/40/10749/super-wicked-problems-and-climat… Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>For a discussion of the EPA reporting rules, listen and download materials from the ELI Seminar <a href="http://www.eli.org/ghg-reporting-rule-so-far-lessons-learned-and-change… Reporting Rule So Far: Lessons Learned and Changes to Consider</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="http://www.epa.gov/&quot; target="_blank">Environmental Protection Agency</a> is currently regulating GHGs under the <a href="http://www.eli.org/keywords/air-1">Clean Air Act</a><a href="#_msocom_16"></a>. While the Clean Air Act regulates many forms of air pollution, it does not mention GHGs by name. On October 20, 1999, a group of private non-profit organizations petitioned EPA to begin regulating greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act. After EPA determined that GHGs were not “air pollutants” subject to CAA regulation and denied the petition, these groups were joined by several states, cities, and citizens’ groups seeking review of EPA’s decision in federal court. In the landmark 2007 decision <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16923241216495494762&amp;hl… v. EPA</em></a><a href="#_msocom_17"></a>, the <a href="http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS22665.pdf&quot; target="_blank">Supreme Court held</a> GHGs <em>can</em> be regulated under the Clean Air Act, and that the plaintiffs in the case had standing<a href="#_msocom_18">[SES18]</a> to sue EPA to ask the agency to begin regulating GHGs.</p>
<p>The result of the case was that greenhouse gases from mobile sources were officially considered “air pollutants.” Under the CAA, EPA was obligated to <a href="#" title="42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).">determine</a> whether they “cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger health or welfare.” In December 2009, the EPA Administrator issued an <a href="http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/&quot; target="_blank">endangerment finding</a>, declaring that “six greenhouse gases taken in combination endanger both the public health and the public welfare,” and that emissions from new motor vehicles “contribute to the greenhouse gas air pollution.”</p>
<p>In light of the endangerment finding, EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), issued <a href="http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-8159.pdf&quot; target="_blank">regulations</a> in May 2010 regulating emissions of these GHGs from <a href="http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations.htm&quot; title="EPA and NHTSA have also proposed GHG emissions standards for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles that will apply to new vehicles beginning in 2014 and has proposed standards for cars and light trucks beyond 2017.">cars and light trucks</a> under Title II of the Clean Air Act.</p>
<p>With GHGs now regulated under the CAA, <a href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-04-02/pdf/2010-7536.pdf&quot; target="_blank">EPA’s interpretation</a> of the Clean Air Act requires it to develop permitting standards for new stationary sources that are major sources of GHGs, such as power plants or manufacturing facilities. EPA is promulgating and implementing regulations for such sources under the <a href="http://www.epa.gov/compliance/monitoring/programs/caa/newsource.html&qu…; target="_blank">new source performance standards</a> and <a href="http://www.epa.gov/nsr/&quot; target="_blank">new source review</a> provisions of the CAA. EPA’s efforts are the subject of significant political controversy and litigation, although challenges to the foundational EPA GHG rulemakings failed to gain traction in court.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For ELR articles addressing the ability of the Clean Air Act to tackle climate change, see Franz Litz, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/40/10480/what-expect-epa-regulation-green… to Expect From EPA: Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act</a>, Robert McKinstry, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/41/10301/clean-air-act-suitable-tool-addr… Clean Air Act: A Suitable Tool for Addressing the Challenges of Climate Change</a>, and Brigham Daniels, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/39/10837/regulating-climate-what-role-cle… Climate: What Role for the Clean Air Act?</a></p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>Listen to and download materials from the ELI seminar <a href="http://www.eli.org/dc-circuits-rulings-epas-greenhouse-gas-rulemakings"… D.C. Circuit’s Rulings on EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Rulemakings</a> to learn how the court upheld EPA’s regulatory program and watch and download materials from a seminar immediately after the court’s oral arguments at <a href="http://www.eli.org/debrief-dc-circuits-oral-arguments-epas-ghg-rulemaki…; target="_blank">Debrief of the D.C. Circuit’s Oral Arguments on EPA’s GHG Rulemakings</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There are many other federal statutes and provisions that can be used to try to control GHGs, ranging from the <a href="http://elr.info/legislative/federal-laws/national-environmental-policy-… Environmental Policy Act</a> to the <a href="http://www.bdlaw.com/assets/attachments/Climate_Change_and_the_Clean_Wa…; target="_blank">Clean Water Act</a> and <a href="http://elr.info/legislative/federal-laws/endangered-species-act">Endang… Species Act</a> and presidential <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/2009fedleader_eo_rel.pdf&quot; target="_blank">Executive Orders</a>. In addition, some are trying to use the courts by arguing there are federal and state <a href="http://www.eli.org/keywords/governance#common-law">common law</a><a href="#_msocom_21"> </a>causes of action against emitters of GHGs as well as <a href="http://www.eli.org/keywords/governance#public-trust">public trust</a><a href="#_msocom_22"></a> doctrine claims.</p>
<h3><a name="state-initiatives"></a>State Initiatives</h3>
<p>States have taken various approaches to address climate change, including the formation of <a href="#regional-initiatives">regional programs</a><a href="#_msocom_23"></a> to address GHG emissions. Among states, <a href="#california-global-warming-solutions-act">California</a><a href="#_msocom_24"></a> has taken the most comprehensive steps toward GHG control, and many <a href="#local-initiatives">localities</a><a href="#_msocom_25"></a> have also undertaken GHG reduction initiatives.</p>
<h5><a name="regional-initiatives"></a>Regional Initiatives</h5>
<p>The <a href="http://rggi.org/&quot; target="_blank">Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative</a> (RGGI) in the Northeast was the first regional GHG reduction effort to be formed, followed by the <a href="http://www.wci-inc.org/&quot; target="_blank">Western Climate Initiative</a> and the <a href="http://www.c2es.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/mggra&quot; target="_blank">Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord</a>. RGGI, formed in December 2005, includes several states in the Northeast and the mid-Atlantic. The agreement applies only to fossil-fuel powered electric generators above a certain size, and covers only CO2 emissions. The core mechanism of RGGI is a market-based cap-and-trade program. The <a href="http://www.rggi.org/docs/Documents/RGGI_Fact_Sheet.pdf&quot; target="_blank">agreement</a> caps CO2 emissions at 2009 levels and requires regulated power plants to hold allowances for each ton of CO2 they emit using a cap and trade program. States are given broad discretion over many aspects of implementation, including initial allocation of allowances, permitting procedures, and exemptions for certain types of facilities. All states are required to direct some percentage of allowance auction proceeds toward energy reinvestment programs that benefit consumers. For example, Maine uses a portion of auction proceeds to subsidize construction of combined heat and power units to improve energy efficiency in factories. In May 2011, New Jersey indicated it is withdrawing from RGGI, and the state legislatures in other states have attempted to withdraw other states from RGGI.</p>
<p>Two other regions have begun to take steps toward implementing their own GHG reduction programs. The <a href="http://www.wci-inc.org/&quot; target="_blank">Western Climate Initiative</a> (WCI), comprising several western states and parts of Canada, was formed in 2007. However, Mexico, Arizona, Washington, Oregon, Montana and Utah have all recently withdrawn leaving only California and four Canadian provinces in the program. WCI intended to implement a cap-and-trade program, similar to RGGI, beginning in 2012, but that is no longer likely, although California may push ahead, perhaps with Canadian partners or on its own. . The withdrawn states have all joined <a href="http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/document-archives/general/North…; target="_blank">North America 2050</a>, a new initiative within WCI that does not include a cap-and-trade program. Seven Midwestern states and Canadian provinces formed the Midwestern Regional Greenhouse Gas Accord (MGGRA) and agreed to develop a <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20140522105252/http://michigancondemnationb…; target="_blank">regional cap-and-trade program</a>, but the initiative has stalled.</p>
<h5><a name="california-global-warming-solutions-act"></a>California Global Warming Solutions Act</h5>
<p>California passed the <a href="http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_32_bill_20…; target="_blank">Global Warming Solutions Act in 2006</a>, containing several major climate change initiatives. The Act’s overall goal is statewide reduction of GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. The <a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/homepage.htm&quot; target="_blank">California Air Resources Board</a> (CARB) is charged with developing and enforcing the implementing regulations of the Act, most of which are to become effective in 2012.</p>
<p>CARB’s <a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scopingplan.htm&quot; target="_blank">Scoping Plan</a> outlines the implementation of the Global Warming Solutions Act, including:</p>
<ul>
<li>A statewide <a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm&quot; target="_blank">cap-and-trade program</a> encompassing sectors that account for over 80% of GHG emissions</li>
<li>Stricter energy efficiency standards for <a href="http://www.energy.ca.gov/title24/2008standards/index.html&quot; target="_blank">buildings</a> and <a href="http://www.energy.ca.gov/appliances/&quot; target="_blank">appliances</a></li>
<li>An increase in required percentage of renewable electricity production under the state’s <a href="http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/&quot; target="_blank">portfolio standard</a></li>
<li>Higher <a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/zevprog/factsheets/advanced_clean_cars_eng…; target="_blank">fuel efficiency standards</a> for cars and light trucks</li>
<li>Low carbon <a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/lcfs.htm&quot; target="_blank">fuel standard</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/energyaudits/energyaudits.htm&quot; target="_blank">Energy efficiency auditing</a> at industrial facilities.</li>
</ul>
<p>CARB has <a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/implementation/implementation.htm&quot; target="_blank">implemented</a> rules requiring <a href="http://arb.ca.gov/cc/reporting/ghg-rep/ghg-rep.htm&quot; target="_blank">GHG emissions reporting and verification</a> and identified “<a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccea/ccea.htm&quot; title="CARB has created nine early action regulations to reduce GHGs: • Low-carbon fuel standards • Methane capture from landfills • Reduction of HFC-134a, a hydroflourocarbon common in mobile air conditioning units • Reduction of GHGs produced by the semi-conductor industry • Multi-sector reduction of sulfur hexafluoride (the most potent GHG) • Limiting GHGs used in consumer products, such as aerosol propellants • Improving fuel efficiency for large semi-trucks • Regulations to encourage greater maintenance of car tire pressure to improve fuel efficiency. • Rules requiring docked ships to obtain power from sources other than their onboard diesel engines. Early Action Items (July 6, 2011).">early action items</a>” reduction measures that could be acted on quickly while the larger implementing regulations are under development.</p>
<p>To further support the goals of the Global Warming Solutions Act, California passed the <a href="http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_0351-0400/sb_375_bill_2…; target="_blank">Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008</a> and a companion bill <a href="http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_0701-0750/sb_732_bill_2…; target="_blank">Senate Bill 732</a>. The Sustainable Communites law requires ARB to develop regional GHG emission reduction targets for passenger vehicles and to establish targets for the State's 18 metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs). The MPOs are required to develop a <a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/sb375/sb375.htm&quot; target="_blank">“sustainable communities strategy”</a> that will meet the emissions reduction targets through adopting sustainable land use, housing and transportation policies. Senate Bill 732 establishes and funds a <a href="http://sgc.ca.gov/&quot; target="_blank">Strategic Growth Council</a> to support these sustainable planning activities.</p>
<h5><a name="local-initiatives"></a>Local Initiatives</h5>
<p>Many localities have undertaken efforts to reduce GHG emissions, such as through the <a href="http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm&quot; target="_blank">U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement</a> and <a href="http://www.iclei.org/&quot; target="_blank">ICLEI</a>. Municipal government steps to address climate change have included developing climate change mitigation and adaptation plans, developing plans to encourage green development and encouraging new programs such as solar energy programs and energy efficiency drives that serve as models for other cities.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a discussion of the role of localities in climate law and policy, read Patricia Salkin,<a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/40/10562/cooperative-federalism-and-clima… Federalism and Climate Change: New Meaning to "Think Globally--Act Locally"</a> and Michael Burger, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/39/11161/empowering-local-autonomy-and-en… Local Autonomy and Encouraging Experimentation in Climate Change Governance: The Case for a Layered Regime</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3>Climate Adaptation Efforts</h3>
<p>While many efforts to address climate change focus on greenhouse gas emission reduction, also known as mitigation, adaptation to climate change is also an important aspect of climate change governance. Increasingly, federal, state and local governments are recognizing the importance of planning for a changing climate and the effects it will have on public health, the environment, and the built environment. For example, a Council on Environmental Quality <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/adaptation…; target="_blank">task force</a> developed recommendations for federal agencies to follow in integrating climate change adaptation planning into their regular planning activities. Many U.S. cities, such as <a href="http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/pdf/reed_presentation_11…; target="_blank">Chula Vista, CA</a>, and <a href="http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/pdf/engert_presentation_…; target="_blank">Keene, NH</a>, have begun the process of adaptation planning at the local level. <a href="http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/adaptatio…; target="_blank">International efforts</a> are also beginning to focus on <a href="http://www.eli.org/climate-energy/strengthen-capacity-adapt-climate-cha…; as well as mitigation.</p>

The Grid Is a Force Multiplier for Decarbonization
Author
Anne Pramaggiore - Exelon Utilities
Exelon Utilities
Current Issue
Issue
2
Parent Article

Deep decarbonization is no pipe dream. But it demands a focus on the most powerful lever for transformation in our energy system: The electric grid.

Electricity is responsible for 28 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Much of the rest comes from other sectors now powered by fossil fuels. But vast swaths of these sectors can be electrified.

As the electricity system gets cleaner, so too does every car and appliance connected to it. The integrated and networked grid that delivers this electricity can be a decarbonization force multiplier.

In an era dominated by platform businesses, the electric grid is the ultimate platform: capable of rationalizing assets, matching consumers and producers of energy, and animating new markets.

A decarbonized electricity system requires more affordable carbon-free resources and energy storage technologies with expanded capacity. We are on our way. Twenty percent of U.S. electricity demand is already met by carbon-free nuclear energy, and the prices of solar, wind, and storage are all down more than 70 percent since 2009. The size of the global energy storage market is projected to double six times over by 2030.

But accelerating these trends — in the most optimally economic and socially equitable way — will require even more ambitious and creative policymaking.

In this energy transformation, technology may lead, but policy rules. Decisions made by policymakers and regulators will direct hundreds of billions of dollars in capital investment and determine whether deep decarbonization is achievable in the time frame our climate challenge demands.

Let’s be clear about what’s required: We are reinventing and redesigning the energy system that fueled the U.S. economy and our quality of life in the last century to ensure the success of our nation’s economy and quality of life in the 21st century. If the United States gets it right, we can be a model for the world.

An economic, equitable, and ultimately carbon-free reinvention requires more connection, not less. We need the power of networks. We need to drive change at scale. In a world where more power sits on roofs and batteries sit in basements; where there are more electric vehicles on the road; and where power is coming from and going to many different places, the grid becomes the most important platform in the economy.

The policy to spur this energy reinvention is tough. The politics can be even tougher. Witness the street protests that wracked France last year over the government’s proposed fuel tax increase. One way to mitigate this kind of backlash could be returning funds raised from a national carbon tax back to the public as a dividend. Exelon announced our support for such a proposal last year.

Many states and cities have committed to reduce carbon emissions 80 percent by 2050 and are taking varying regulatory approaches to get there. California has relied on policy mandates to incentivize the transition to renewables, smart grids, and distributed energy resources. New York has relied more on market incentives. Illinois’s approach falls somewhere in between.

Each state will find the model that works best for its citizens. But every state should see the grid as indispensable to its decarbonization goals.

Exelon has developed a multi-step maturity model that envisions the evolution of the grid from the starting point of functional modernization to a future where the grid is the essential connective tissue for communities taking on the interrelated challenges of climate change, economic development, and improved quality of life.

Many utilities — empowered by innovative regulatory frameworks — have already made the foundational investments in smart-grid infrastructure to progress through the first two stages of this model: modernizing for reliability and improving resiliency and security against threats likes cyberattacks and extreme weather events.

Now, a new wave of policy innovation is needed to enable utilities to take the next steps to expand customer choice and accelerate the adoption of distributed resources — and to achieve decarbonization through growing amounts of carbon-free supply resources and more rapid electrification of transportation and manufacturing.

When Thomas Edison devised a power-distribution system for lighting bulbs in millions of homes, he remarked there “was no precedent for such a thing.” Over 100 years later, the IPCC described our climate challenge in similar terms, saying it requires a scale of economic and societal transformation with “no documented historical precedent.”

Over a century ago, the right technology and policy enabled us to invent a new energy system. Today, with the right technology and policy, we can reinvent it, to achieve deep decarbonization.

The Path to Zero Goes Through California
Author
Mary Nichols - California Air Resources Board
California Air Resources Board
Current Issue
Issue
2
Parent Article

Last November, California burned. Again. As the Camp Fire devastated the town of Paradise, the Woolsey Fire tore through Malibu. More than 15,000 families — humble retirees and celebrities alike — lost their homes. At least 88 people lost their lives.

For the third time in just over a year, smoke blanketed our state. The long shadow of suffering stretched hundreds of miles for weeks. Hazardous air pollution affected millions of Californians. They were the lucky ones.

Schools closed. Kids were stuck inside for days on end. Again.

Climate change has many names — like Maria, Harvey, Sandy, or Katrina. No region is exempt, whether it’s the melting permafrost that underlies Alaska or the vanishing fisheries that sustain so many.

There is no longer a conflict between mitigation and adaptation. We must do both. And do it quickly, before the costs of inaction become insurmountable.

That is why, ahead of the Global Climate Action Summit in San Francisco last September, then Governor Jerry Brown signed an executive order calling on California to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, and no later than 2045, and to achieve and maintain negative emissions thereafter. It positions California as the largest economy in the world to commit to climate neutrality before mid-century.

Achieving climate neutrality entails four big steps. They are all feasible, and all offer significant economic and health benefits in addition to their role in putting a stop to catastrophic climate change. Each is well underway in California and several other states.

First, we must immediately slash emissions of the most potent, fast-acting “super pollutants” — methane, black carbon, and hydrofluorocarbons. Doing so will save millions of lives globally and cut the expected rate of global warming in half by 2050. California has a detailed plan to cut these harmful pollutants by 40-50 percent by 2030, and plans to launch its own satellite capable of pinpointing methane leaks around the world, allowing fast and cost-effective remedial action.

Second, we must transition to 100 percent clean energy, wherever possible and as quickly as possible. California is one of an increasing number of jurisdictions committed to 100 percent clean energy in its power grid. Next up are vehicles.

With renewable power already cheaper than fossil fuels and electric cars and trucks promising to be so soon, these transitions will lower energy and transportation costs for families and businesses, while improving public health. We must accelerate these transitions through incentives, infrastructure investment, regulations, and improved education and outreach.

Third, we must quickly scale carbon dioxide removal strategies. California has committed $1 billion to improve management of our forests and reduce wildfire risk, with the goal of enabling forests to pull and store more carbon from the atmosphere. We will significantly ramp up efforts to protect our natural landscapes and rural communities, and unleash their potential in the fight against climate change.

With emerging technologies, we will pull carbon dioxide from the air and put it to use to make clean fuels and new materials — creating entire new industries. California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard offers one proving ground for these technologies and industries. We need a mix of new policies, including financial and regulatory incentives, to move rapidly from the laboratory to the mainstream.

Finally, we must work together. California has the will and the ability to be a test bed for innovation, but we need collaborators to foster global action. We need to create new partnerships with cities, regions, and civil society actors to fight climate change and its ugly sibling air pollution, which together threaten the health of children and the most vulnerable in California, and all over the world.

No single approach will work everywhere. Greenhouse gases twine themselves throughout the world economy. Imposing a price on carbon through a tax or a cap-and-trade program is surely necessary, but a carbon price alone does not make car companies build cleaner cars, oil companies provide cleaner fuels, builders construct low-carbon buildings, landfill operators limit methane leaks, or industries transition away from hydrofluorocarbons. Indeed, the recent IPCC report highlights that a mixture of regulations with carbon pricing offers the lowest cost and quickest path to deep decarbonization.

California does not have all the answers, but we have built a model that demonstrates how addressing climate change and growing the economy can reinforce one another. We are on the path and will keep forging ahead, all the way to zero.

A Legal Playbook for Deep Cuts in Greenhouse Gases
Author
John C. Dernbach - Widener University
Widener University
Current Issue
Issue
2
Parent Article

Deep decarbonization in the United States is economically and technologically feasible. More than 1,000 legal mechanisms — federal, state, local, and private — are available to do the job. And there is a wide variety in the tools, enhancing the likelihood of political agreement on some combination that would work.

No one had really figured out the basics of entirely removing greenhouse gas emissions until 2012. Jim Williams and others published a paper in Science saying that there has “been little physically realistic modeling of the energy and economic transformations required” to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80 percent from 1990 levels by 2050. That article provides a model for deep decarbonization using three pillars: energy efficiency, zero-carbon electricity, and moving from liquid fuels in the transportation and building sectors to decarbonized electricity.

The article spurred formation of the Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project. The DDPP is a global effort to assess the technological and economic feasibility of deep decarbonization in 16 countries representing 74 percent of the world’s emissions.

In 2014 and 2015, DDPP published two reports on deep decarbonization in the United States. These reports conclude that “it is technically feasible” for the country to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions at least 80 percent in the next three decades. They also conclude that the cost of this effort would only be one percent of U.S. gross domestic product. They do not calculate the considerable public health, safety, security, economic, environmental, and other benefits, which are likely to contribute significantly to GDP.

Enormous changes would be required to achieve this level of reduction, the reports say. The United States would need to more than double the efficiency with which energy is used. Nearly all electricity would be carbon free or use carbon capture and sequestration. Electricity production would also double, because gasoline and diesel fuel for transportation would be mostly replaced by electricity.

But how is this to be accomplished? Deep decarbonization is not likely to occur unless general policies are translated into specific laws and then implemented.

To that end, in late 2015, Michael Gerrard of Columbia Law School and I began planning an edited volume to comprehensively analyze and explain the various laws that could be employed, building on the DDPP reports. The resulting book, Legal Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in the United States, is being published by the ELI Press in March. In 35 chapters authored by 59 experts, the book identifies hundreds of legal tools that could be employed to achieve deep decarbonization.

Legal Pathways describes a dozen different types of such mechanisms. These are not just the usual suspects — for instance, command-and-control regulation, market-leveraging approaches, and tradable permits or allowances — but also reduction or removal of legal barriers to clean energy and removal of incentives for fossil fuel development and use. The tool set also includes information and persuasion, better infrastructure, technology R&D, insurance reforms, property rights, and social equity.

The book is more than a toolbox. To switch metaphors, it is ultimately a playbook for deep decarbonization. In American football, a playbook is a comprehensive listing of all of the formations that can be employed by a particular team. In any one game, some of these plays will be used, and some will not, depending on the circumstances. Similarly, we realize that not all of the Legal Pathways tools will be used, but public and private decisionmakers can choose various combinations to achieve the needed reductions in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed, various legal tools could be designed and combined to achieve quicker and deeper reductions than 80 percent by 2050, and even to achieve negative overall emissions.

While both the scale and complexity of deep decarbonization are enormous, the book has a simple message: deep decarbonization is achievable in the United States using laws that exist or could be enacted. These and other legal tools can be employed with significant economic, social, environmental, and national security benefits.

The wide range of types of mechanisms also provides great opportunity for building consensus. One particularly important category, for example, is reduction or removal of legal barriers. The many types of tools also make clear that a great many types of lawyers and other professionals are important in this effort, including not only energy and environmental experts, but also including specialists in finance, corporations, municipalities, procurement, contracting, and real estate.

Toward that end, Professor Gerrard and I are launching a project to turn the recommendations into legal language — drafting model federal and state statutes and regulations, blueprints for local ordinances, guidance documents, transactional agreements, and the like. We welcome lawyers from all backgrounds to join in this effort — all environmental professionals have a role to play.

Air Act Success Serves As Model for Carbon Cuts
Author
Ann Carlson - UCLA Emmett Institute on Climate Change and the Environment
UCLA Emmett Institute on Climate Change and the Environment
Current Issue
Issue
2
Parent Article

The technological challenges we face to decarbonize the economy are immense. But the governance challenges necessary to spur technological development and deliver massive greenhouse gas reductions may be even larger. The lag between emissions cuts and climate benefits, the sheer scale of the energy transformation, and the complex connection between emissions and harms make the problems especially thorny. Deep decarbonization requires close attention to governance.

In a forthcoming book, my co-authors and I suggest that climate policy will need to build in three attributes in the regime that governs multi-decadal greenhouse gas reductions. To start, policy should be durable, capable of sustaining a long-term energy transformation through steadily declining emissions. We need to send a consistent signal to the private sector to invest in substantial infrastructure. Policy must also be adaptable to incorporate and respond to new scientific, technological, and economic information. Policies then must both endure and evolve. Finally, the climate transformation will be the most complicated environmental challenge we have ever confronted. Decisionmakers should also embrace policy flexibility, drawing on emitter knowledge and experience to determine how best to reduce emissions at lowest cost.

Though the governance challenge is an immense one, the United States has confronted other major environmental problems with significant success. The Clean Air Act, in particular, has delivered extraordinary benefits in the five decades since its adoption, reducing multiple pollutants across the country from a huge number of sources.

Our book contains in-depth studies of five CAA programs from an interdisciplinary team of legal scholars, economists, and political scientists to examine the extent to which these programs incorporate mechanisms to promote durability, adaptability, and flexibility. Our focus is not on the use of the act to reduce greenhouse gas emissions — even though the CAA requires that. Instead, the book evaluates our experience in reducing traditional air pollution to see what it can tell us about promoting policy that meets the three necessary attributes.

The book reaches several conclusions: Policymakers should delegate significant, but not unlimited, discretion to an expert agency. Limitations might include the setting of deadlines, requirements to collect updated information, and citizen suit provisions. One of the most powerful adaptive mechanisms in the CAA is the broad delegation to the Environmental Protection Agency of authority to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards. Importantly, this authority is cabined by the requirement that the standards be revisited every five years and, if warranted, tightened based on up-to-date scientific information and enforced in part through citizen suits. The NAAQS program has not only led to massive reductions in ubiquitous pollutants that had been identified at the time the CAA was passed, such as lead and carbon monoxide, but also to the reduction of pollution whose harm was not even recognized in 1970, such as fine particles.

Well-structured, adaptable policy promotes durability — the two are deeply intertwined. Policies that promote regularized adaptability with built-in processes can make policy long-lasting, delivering pollution reductions decades after a statute is passed but in a manner that is predictable and legitimate. With regularized review and procedural fairness, policymakers can signal how regulation will develop in the future and help regulated parties form expectations that guide investment decisions.

Regularized, built-in processes will also foster stakeholder involvement, allowing supportive coalitions to emerge and adapt to new information and to coalesce around new proposals. CAA programs that contain provisions that promote regularized adaptability include not only NAAQS but also technology-based standards for stationary sources that require the Best Available Control Technology, and California’s special role in regulating mobile sources.

Flexible mechanisms can also make policy more durable and adaptable. Such mechanisms in the CAA draw on the expertise of regulated parties, incentivize private innovation, and minimize the cost of pollution reduction, making regulation more politically palatable. Flexibility has also produced adaptability by producing information about cost-effective regulatory approaches and technologies that have led to further pollution reductions. Examples here include the phase-out of lead in gasoline, the Acid Rain Program, the Clean Air Transport Rule, and technology-based standards for stationary sources.

Our book is based on this foundational premise: to develop the technology necessary to achieve deep decarbonization by mid-century, we need to create governance mechanisms that promote durability, adaptability, and flexibility. The Clean Air Act provides crucial lessons about how to do so.

A Few Keys to Saving the Planet Cost-effectively
Author
Joseph E. Aldy - Harvard Kennedy School
Harvard Kennedy School
Current Issue
Issue
2
Parent Article

Virtually every activity a person undertakes on a typical day — driving to work, charging a phone, cooking dinner — contributes to carbon dioxide emissions. And the daily activities occurring at a business — running an assembly line, operating a harvester, shipping goods — likewise affect greenhouse gas emissions. With fossil fuels representing four-fifths of U.S. energy consumption, decarbonizing the energy foundation of American society will require a comprehensive, economy-wide approach to emission reductions.

A carbon tax is the most effective approach — environmentally, economically, and politically — to reduce emissions and promote the innovation necessary for realizing a zero-carbon economy.

Pricing carbon taps into the ingenuity of businesses and entrepreneurs. The technology-neutral approach of a carbon tax allows any clever emission-reducing idea to have consideration in the market. Instead of relying on a small number of government staff to identify and select an industry’s abatement technology, letting the market investigate pollution control opportunities would attract many more people, small-businesses, and corporate research offices to tackle the problem.

As a result, pricing carbon would deliver emission abatement at lower cost than anyone would predict ex ante. This reflects the extensive experience in how businesses and individuals have responded to changing energy prices over the past five decades. For example, power sector carbon emissions have fallen by one-quarter in large part due to the shift from coal to natural gas. The increase in the price of coal relative to gas drove this transition, and a carbon tax would likewise drive further transitions to low- and zero-carbon sources of energy.

By getting the biggest climate bang for the buck, a carbon tax makes the politics and economics of dramatic emission reductions easier. Imposing the same carbon price on all emission sources is fair by ensuring that everyone who pollutes must bear the same cost for their pollution. As a transparent, administratively simple approach, a carbon tax is good public policy in a democracy and mitigates the prospect of regulatory capture by special interests.

By generating revenues, a carbon tax can finance research and development in next generation technologies and target resources — through tax reform, a regular per capita dividend check, or other approach — to ensure a broad, durable political coalition supporting the policy. Finally, a carbon tax would enable U.S. negotiators to reclaim leadership on international climate policy and work with partners around the world for enhanced ambition in their domestic mitigation policies.

A carbon tax would represent a major change from decades of U.S. energy and environmental policy. Traditionally, federal regulators have employed an industry-specific approach — mandating scrubbers on new power plants or requiring improvements in vehicle fuel economy — and Congress has designed technology-specific subsidies in the tax code, such as the wind production tax credit and the electric vehicle tax credit. In contrast, an economy-wide carbon tax is sector-neutral and technology-neutral.

The patchwork of sector-specific regulations and technology-specific subsidies has its supporters. Special interests — who may benefit from subsidies — would likely prefer to sustain these in lieu of a technology-neutral approach. And some environmentalists have criticized a market-based system with no cap because of the resulting uncertainty in emissions.

The status quo regulatory approach, however, is likewise subject to considerable uncertainty, as evident by the tortured history of the Obama EPA’s Clean Power Plan in the courts and under the Trump administration. A carbon tax can be designed to address emission uncertainty. For example, if the country fails to achieve an emission benchmark, the tax could increase automatically, as has been done in Switzerland. Further, the carbon tax can be structured for periodic updating as we learn more about the science of climate change as well as the tax’s environmental, economic, technological, and diplomatic impacts.

The current suite of policy tools that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s is not a good fit for today’s American energy economy. Consider the questions it raises.

What does it mean to regulate fuel economy in terms of miles per gallon of gasoline if vehicles may be powered by electricity or hydrogen? If we impose stringent emission regulations on the power sector and thus raise electricity prices, does that impede the transition from internal combustion cars to electric vehicles? Likewise, does an industry-specific approach that raises power prices but not the price of natural gas or heating oil delay the electrification of home heating, which may be the most feasible route to zero-emission homes? Would industry-specific and technology-specific regulations and subsidies weaken incentives for new energy technologies with applications across industries and uses?

With energy-related barriers between sectors falling and the rapid emergence of new technologies, the traditional approach to regulations and subsidies will likely lag instead of lead in cutting emissions and driving innovation. A carbon tax is a 21st century tool for the 21st century problem of decarbonizing the modern economy.

Reports Say Dire Effects Will Be Starting Soon. How Can the Economy Quickly Shed Carbon?
Author
Joseph E. Aldy - Harvard Kennedy School
Ann Carlson - UCLA/Emmett Institute on Climate Change and the Environment
John C. Dernbach - Widener University
Mary Nichols - California Air Resources Board
Anne Pramaggiore - Exelon Utilities
Mike Quigley - House of Representatives Sustainable Energy and Environment Coalition
Harvard Kennedy School
UCLA/Emmett Institute on Climate Change and the Environment
Widener University
California Air Resources Board
Exelon Utilities
House of Representatives Sustainable Energy and Environment Coalition
Current Issue
Issue
2
Reports Say Dire Effects Will Be Starting Soon. How Can the Economy Quickly Shed

With the influx of new members of Congress in January, suddenly everybody is talking about a Green New Deal that would address greenhouse gas emissions and a bunch of other social ills via a suite of related policy instruments. Proponents are talking about ridding the American energy economy of carbon, and on a short timeline — perhaps by 2030. Even before the recent change in Congress, policymakers and stakeholders had been talking about what has come to be called deep decarbonization. A benchmark proposal calls for eliminating at least 80 percent of greenhouse emissions by mid-century, with further reductions to follow.

The Trump administration’s National Climate Assessment released in November predicts global warming will soon have a significant impact on the American economy. A few weeks earlier, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change forecast severe effects starting in the next 10 to 20 years — and getting worse thereafter — and argued for a maximum temperature increase over pre-industrial levels lower than the 2 degrees Celsius established in the 2015 Paris Agreement. The White House’s plans to withdraw from the accord and to roll back regulations aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions are the exact opposite of what these reports conclude is required.

Into this policy void have stepped a number of key players who are advocating a rich array of approaches, with the Green New Deal being merely the most famous one. A group of conservative leaders have proposed a carbon tax, an idea endorsed by many academic economists, including 2018 Nobel Laureate William Nordhaus. States such as California, Hawaii, and most of the Northeast have charted their own path toward removing carbon from their energy systems. And the private sector has begun to innovate, with power companies announcing ambitious emission goals, including some planning to go 100 percent carbon-free, and car companies like Tesla and Volvo giving up internal combustion engines.

This Debate in Print concentrates on the U.S. energy system and asks, How should public policy move forward to promote the decarbonization of the American economy? And what blend of law, economics, science, and technology will get the job done?

With the influx of new members of Congress in January, suddenly everybody is talking about a Green New Deal that would address greenhouse gas emissions and other social ills via a suite of interlinked policies. Proponents are talking about ridding the American energy economy of carbon, and on a short timeline — by 2030.

Climate and Controversy
Author
Joel B. Stronberg - The JBS Group
The JBS Group
Current Issue
Issue
2
Climate and Controversy

There are few public forums to debate the causes and consequences of climate change where the participants won’t find themselves mired in a political maelstrom. On the federal level, where national policies are worked out, partisan gridlock in Congress has taken the legislative branch of government out of play. The current administration has by acts and deeds indicated it has no intention of combatting climate change — quite the opposite. That leaves the fortunes of U.S. climate policies largely dependent upon the composition of the courts, the branch that is concerned only with matters of law and immune from politics.

Carbon emissions in the United States and other big economies like China, India, and elsewhere are on the rise. According to the Trump administration’s Fourth National Climate Assessment, released in November, neither global efforts to mitigate the causes of climate change nor regional efforts to adapt to the impacts currently approach the scales needed to avoid substantial damage to the U.S. economy, our natural heritage, and the health and well-being of Americans. The conclusions reached by the 13 federal agencies and 300 scientists contributing to the assessment reflect the overwhelming consensus of the science community. They affirm the October report of the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which set the maximum safe level of warming at only 1.5 degrees Celsius.

Both reports emphasize the urgent need for government action. They identify — with a high degree of confidence — the costly consequences of climate change. These include not only more frequent and intense weather events but also higher rates of morbidity and mortality and lost jobs and investment opportunities in industries affected by carbon emissions, such as fishing, farming, forestry, and insurance.

As the U.S. government fails to put in place policies to combat global warming and adapt to its repercussions, the courts are emerging as the preferred venue in which to debate climate science free of partisan bias and bickering. Citizens are calling for action, and the number of climate-related lawsuits is increasing globally, and nowhere more than in the United States. The cases fall into four broad categories. Some would force government to increase (or some decrease) regulatory oversight and enforcement of existing laws. Others characterize climate change as a rights-based issue. Still others seek to establish climate change as a financial concern. And a final category of cases are designed to contribute to the public debate about the changes to the Earth’s climate system. Naturally there is some overlap, but these distinctions are useful in evaluating the judiciary’s response to global warming.

The most common climate-related cases brought before the courts in the United States continue to be those questioning government regulatory actions involving emissions from coal-fired power plants. Challenges to government regulatory actions have been bidirectional. Obama’s aggressive efforts to combat climate change and protect the environment prompted fossil fuel interests, for instance coal mine operators, to challenge the government’s regulatory authority under existing legislation such as the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs in the Trump era, however, are predictably suing to prevent the administration from rolling back existing regulations.

Regulatory litigation relies heavily on court precedents, particularly the Chevron doctrine establishing judicial deference to expert agencies, as well as conformity with the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirements for proper notice and public input, and interpretation of legislative language to yield enumerated or implied agency authority. Science in these types of cases plays more of a supporting role. In Massachusetts v. EPA, for example, the Supreme Court was asked in 2007 if the Environmental Protection Agency has the authority to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles.

It was the Court’s opinion that EPA is obligated under the CAA to regulate auto emissions which in the administrator’s “judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution . . . reasonably . . . anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” The Court directed the agency to reconsider its conclusions — although the majority opinion left little doubt about the dangers of vehicle emissions. “The harms associated with climate change are serious and well recognized,” the Massachusetts court said. “The government’s own objective assessment of the relevant science and a strong consensus among qualified experts indicate that global warming threatens, inter alia, a precipitate rise in sea levels, severe and irreversible changes to natural ecosystems, a significant reduction in winter snowpack with direct and important economic consequences, and increases in the spread of disease and the ferocity of weather events.” Still, the Court’s instructions to EPA were to consider whether the above events rise to the threshold required to make an endangerment finding under the CAA and the basis for any regulation of the vehicle emissions at issue. That has left combating climate change up to the political branches, which have been deadlocked on the issue for decades.

Into the breach, a new class of cases claiming the right of citizens to a habitable environment is gaining entrance into state and federal courts, and other cases are inviting the judiciary to be more involved in resolving the controversies surrounding climate change. After all, the Constitution grants to the courts the power and ability to decide “cases and controversies,” and that is exactly what is happening here.

In 2015, a U.S. district court judge in Oregon granted standing to 21 youthful plaintiffs claiming that future generations have a substantive right to be protected from the ravages of climate change under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The youths fault the government for inaction in the face of hard evidence. The relief sought by the plaintiffs is science-based policies and regulations to mitigate the impacts of global warming.

The case, Juliana v. United States, has survived multiple attempts — including two before the Supreme Court — to have it dismissed as a political question. Administration attorneys contend that EPA is charged with regulating greenhouse gas emissions, and the court’s intervention confounds the separation of powers on which our political system is based. The case is back before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals after the trial judge certified the government’s request for an interlocutory appeal. A decision is expected by the end of March.

Juliana has inspired a host of similar cases — particularly in state courts, where the Public Trust Doctrine has more foundation — around the nation. Should Juliana or other rights-based cases continue to survive dismissal motions, it will be the first time climate science is put on trial.

Another series of cases making it onto court dockets are those based on common law nuisance theory — tortious negligence. Examples of these types of cases are the recent — and so far, unsuccessful — lawsuits by cities, counties, and states seeking compensation from major oil companies for infrastructure damage and other losses attributable to climate change. Many wastewater and drinking water plants are affected by sea-level rise, as are roadways, ports, etc. These cases are similar to the tobacco suits by state governments of the 1980s and 1990s.

In late 2018, in a rare case in which two private entities were party to a climate suit, a food industry sued fossil fuel companies. A California court has granted the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations standing to sue major oil producers. The petitioner is the largest commercial fishing trade group on the West Coast. On behalf of Dungeness crab fisheries, the organization is seeking $445 million in compensatory damages as a result of toxic algae blooms. The blooms, caused by warming Pacific waters, delayed the opening of the crab season off the California and Oregon coasts, creating economic losses for which recovery is sought. (The Department of Commerce has already allocated $15 million from available disaster assistance funds to help the industry.) The plaintiffs in the crab fishing case, like the state and local governments, are claiming the defendant companies have known for nearly half a century that unrestricted production and use of their fossil fuel products create greenhouse gas pollution. The case may open the door to future negligence suits by private companies against the fossil fuel industry.

Major oil companies and the federal government are not the only ones being sued for knowing the causes and consequences of climate change and choosing to do nothing about it. In 2013 a deluge that overwhelmed a labyrinth of aging sewers and giant tunnels, forcing a noxious mix of sewage and stormwater into local waterways and Lake Michigan, resulted in a lawsuit by Farmers Insurance Company against Chicago-area municipalities for negligently failing to upgrade their systems. An insurance industry expert said of the suit that the companies are in the business of covering unforeseen risks, from accidents. But we’re now at a point with the science where climate change is a foreseeable risk. Thus, a common thread running through the tort cases is establishing what the defendants knew and when.

Importantly, the litigation involves establishing and apportioning liability to monetize damages. These are acts that rely heavily on understanding and accepting climate science as it has grown over the years, and are areas where courts are particularly able to sort out the issues. Theoretically, a courtroom should be the most trusted venue for a rigorous climate-science debate. The judge in City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., a district court common law nuisance case against major oil companies decided last year, asked the litigants to conduct a two-hour briefing on the science of climate change. In the briefing the opponents in the case all agreed that climate change is as real and damaging as the overwhelming majority of the world’s scientists say it is. The case was dismissed, however, on the grounds that the matter at issue is a political question for the legislative and executive branches to answer. Judge William Alsup, however, articulated his belief that temperatures are rising: “This [court] order fully accepts the vast scientific consensus that the combustion of fossil fuels has materially increased atmospheric carbon dioxide levels, which in turn has increased the median temperature of the planet and accelerated sea-level rise.”

The growing appeal to the judiciary to accomplish what the legislative and executive branches are politically incapable of doing is understandable. As a practical matter, however, the courts alone offer a less than ideal alternative to congressional and executive action. Lawsuits, at one level, are zero-sum. A plaintiff is granted standing to sue or told to go home. Dismissal of a case may be for procedural reasons having nothing to do with the scientific substance of the allegations. Moreover, these emerging classes of cases can take years to reach a conclusion, as the Juliana plaintiffs are finding out nearly four years into their litigation, with a trial yet to be held.

However, long before the last gavel is struck, and the final decision read, climate-rights and liability cases have much to contribute. Through discovery, evidence, testimony, and cross examination, the lawsuits are becoming rich troves of information that may have equal or greater probative value in the court of public opinion than in a court of law.

In the wake of the recent dismissal in City of Oakland are records of the defendant oil companies having agreed with plaintiffs’ factual statements on the causes and consequences of global warming. No matter the outcome in Juliana, the Trump administration has accepted the truth of the mainstream climate-science community and the reality of Earth’s warming.

Notwithstanding the possibility these cases may never be victorious in terms of a binary winning or losing, they present an opportunity for climate defenders and deniers to face off in a moderated, nonpartisan venue governed by longstanding rules of evidence and procedure. Sworn testimony subject to cross-examination offers a counterpoint to ipse dixit pronouncements of opinion in partisan legislative hearings or presidential tweets.

According to Gallup’s last available poll, Republican trust in the judicial branch has gone from 48 percent in 2016 to 79 percent in 2017. At the same time, Republicans, in general, hold the lowest opinions of climate science and climate scientists, according to the Pew Research Center. The distrust of scientists based on their perceived political leanings makes it nearly impossible to expect that deniers will become believers when confronted with hard scientific evidence. So a neutral means of deciding issues concerned with climate science is absolutely essential to convince those who still doubt humanity’s role in warming and required actions.

In Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont upheld the state’s plan to approve greenhouse gas emission regulations for new motor vehicles. Vermont’s plan was consistent with the Clean Air Act’s California exemption clause. The litigants both called upon expert testimony concerning the causes and consequences of climate change.

The Green Mountain court noted the Supreme Court’s 1993 conclusions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, in which the High Court enumerated a list of four non-exclusive considerations bearing on whether a theory is scientifically sufficient to constitute reliable evidence. As stated by the Daubert court, a sufficiency analysis is quantitative rather than qualitative, and “facts or data” may include reliable opinions of other experts and hypotheses that are supported by the evidence. In addition to the four factors listed in Daubert, courts consider whether the expert is testifying about matters based on research independent of the litigation.

To be admitted into evidence an expert’s opinion must be derived by recognized scientific methodologies. Courts are not required to “admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert,” as stated in General Electric Co. v. Joiner (1997). An example of such testimony is President Trump’s recent comment that he has a “natural instinct for science” and his uncle was a scientist at MIT, and therefore he knows that climate change is a bogus theory.

Still, climate science isn’t as well-founded as the physics of celestial bodies, for example. But if most scientists are to be believed, immediate action is necessary. A practical consequence of evidentiary rules is the judiciary’s acceptance of reliable testimony that need not be “known to a certainty.” As the judge in Green Mountain wrote, “There are no certainties in science.” Thus, actions to avoid a highly likely risk are called for in the case of climate change, just as we minimize risk of exposure to chemicals that we only suspect of carcinogenicity.

Documents in the Juliana case are now available; they include reports by the litigants’ respective experts. The reports vary in length and detail and are a preview of what the experts will be testifying to in open court. Consider the report of scientists Susan Pacheco and Jerome Paulson, who were retained by the plaintiffs. Their opposite on the defendant’s side is Arthur Partikian. Note when reading the excerpts below that standing requires that a plaintiff must have suffered an actual injury or harm, traceable to the actions of the defendant, and capable of redress by the court.

Although children are not considered a suspect class under the law, the age of the Juliana plaintiffs is integral to their allegations. Pacheco and Paulson state: “Children are uniquely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change due to their physiological features, including their higher respiratory rate, lung growth, and development, immature immune system. . . . [C]ertain populations of children are especially vulnerable. . . [including] children with preexisting medical conditions, children from communities of color, and economically disadvantaged children.”

Partikian responds: “While I do not contest the general concept that factors mentioned by the plaintiffs’ experts as potentially associated with climate change. . . I do not find adequate documentation in the available records and reports.”

Other experts called to the witness stand will testify on whether the nation can run solely on low-carbon technologies like wind and solar. The economic and monetary costs of the transition to a clean energy economy will be debated, as will the social cost of carbon. Ultimately, a jury will have to decide the value of the evidence and what actions, if any, are required by the parties.

In reading through the voluminous motions, complaints, and reports in the novel-legal-claims cases, what is most startling is what they seem not to be about — whether global climate change is real or a hoax. The Trump administration in Juliana has stipulated to the plaintiffs’ statements about the existence of global warming, recognized its harmful consequences, and acknowledged that humans are contributors to the problem in much the same manner as the oil companies are doing in the nuisance cases. The issues, rather, are fault, apportionment, and appropriate response.

The willingness of oil companies and the Trump administration to accede to the petitioner’s climate characterizations reflects a shift in the public position of “mainstream” climate-deniers in recent years. That change was on prominent display during the confirmation hearings of Scott Pruitt to EPA, Ryan Zinke to Interior, Rex Tillerson to the State Department, and other of Trump’s nominees. The new tactic accepts, with certain caveats, that climate change is afoot and acknowledges that human activity is “somehow” a contributor.

In recent months the Trump administration has added a closing statement to the acknowledgment. Buried in a draft environmental impact statement supporting the proposed freeze of auto emission standards at 2020 levels, the administration indicates that any meaningful effort to combat climate change “would require substantial increases in technology innovation and adoption compared to today’s levels and would require the economy . . . to move away from the use of fossil fuels, which is not currently technologically . . . or economically feasible.”

The statement is not made as a call to arms but as a fatalistic foreboding of what the future will hold. The “yes, but there is nothing that can reasonably be done about it” protestations of deniers in public policy arenas is a version of the challenges plaintiffs face in a trial. Should deniers lose in court, they will find there is something to be done and at a price.

It is arguable that the court’s order to do the inventory and in essence draft what for all intents and purposes would be Obama’s Clean Power Plan on steroids could be slowed, if not stopped, by a hostile Congress and White House. In any event whatever would come of the order would be back in the courts from the moment a notice of intent was published in the Federal Register.

Realistically combating climate change will take more than a court’s ordering EPA to write regulations. Absent political considerations of deployment, technological solutions only work on paper. It is not to say that the government is right and that Juliana and other novel-theory cases should be dismissed because the courts would be stepping out of their co-equal role and doing the job of policymaking that is reserved for the legislature and the executive.

Bringing policy considerations into the courtroom will prove as valuable to the public debate as taking validated scientific evidence established in the courtroom and putting it into the court of public opinion. An understanding of the political context — in reality, and not as a hypothetical construct — will help to guide the courts in their consideration of redressability, for example, by allowing the government flexibility to attack the problems from multiple directions.

Synergies exist between court proceedings and public policy debates. Courts are loathe to consider future injuries both because of their speculative nature — there is no guarantee that injuries will arise, and there is difficulty in monetizing the damage that might occur 20 years into the future. In contrast, it is natural for public policies to anticipate and respond to problems likely to pop up in the future, such as increasing a community’s resilience to extreme weather events.

The court testimony of the Juliana medical experts would naturally address the potential damages of cumulative exposure to a climate altered by the release of carbon dioxide, methane, hydrofluorocarbons, and other GHGs. Testimony in the fishing damages case will not only speak to the consequences of warming oceans from carbon released by burning oil but will convert climate concerns into dollar and cents. Although courts may not account for anticipatory damage in their orders and opinions, the information introduced into evidence during the trial would strengthen the public policy debate outside of the courtroom, even if the case is dismissed.

The hyper-partisanship preventing a balanced discussion on climate science in the halls of Congress and the White House also prevents a balanced and rational discussion on possible cures. The value of the courts is not simply to be measured in terms of final outcomes. Under partisan circumstances, the judiciary remains the only venue in which an honest and objective climate debate can occur.

In answer to the government’s claim that a courtroom is not the proper setting in which to weigh the evidence in support of climate change theory, the magistrate judge in Juliana stated: “Whether . . . climate change is occurring, whether . . . human induced, and the degree of its severity and impact on the global climate, natural environment, human health is quintessentially a subject of scientific study and methodology, not solely political debate. The judicial forum is particularly well-suited for the resolution of factual and expert scientific disputes, providing an opportunity for all parties to present evidence, under oath and subject to cross-examination in a process that is public, open, and on the record.”

Redressing the harms alleged by plaintiffs is time constrained. It has already taken the youthful petitioners in Juliana several years to get to trial. How many more years will go by before the Supreme Court makes the final judgment in the case? How many years after that will be required for EPA to do the emissions inventory and draft and implement a new power plan? Should the defendant government and companies in these novel-theory cases start losing in court, they will find there is something to be done and at a price. Yet the latest findings of climate science make it clear that immediate, large-scale actions are required.

Neither the Juliana plaintiffs nor others in pending or anticipated climate-science cases should be expected to carry the burden of a livable environment alone. The growing number of climate-related lawsuits based on novel legal theories will continue to expand at least as long as the government fails to put partisanship aside and do what is necessary to stem Earth’s warming and increase the nation’s resilience to the effects already being experienced.

As different as the emerging novel-legal-theory cases are they share the same objective — a livable environment. Win or lose each can contribute to the overall efforts of climate defenders. What was the role of science in each case? What arguments swayed judges and jurors? Where do the litigants’ experts agree; were there gaps in a plaintiff’s arguments that need to be filled? Did the public rallies in support of the Juliana plaintiffs change the community’s perception of global warming? Is the relief asked for in one case duplicative or additive to what was requested in another? Can the cases be better coordinated to create more holistic solutions to global warming?

Although each climate case is unique, they all share the same objective — a habitable global environment. Legal and policy advocates need to come together to develop an integrated strategy designed to prevail in the court of public opinion as well as of law. Even if a plaintiff loses a case, pursuing it may be validated if the court’s decision includes statements that may be useful for the larger purpose of convincing the public and prodding the political branches to action as a result. TEF

LEAD FEATURE ❧ As a locus for fact-finding and evaluating competing claims while the political branches are deadlocked, the courtroom can be the perfect neutral venue for debating climate science, policy responses, and who should pay. Current litigation could tee up such conclusions.

Oil Spill Kicked Off Anti-Pollution Era
Author
Stephen R. Dujack - Environmental Law Institute
Environmental Law Institute
Current Issue
Issue
1

Oil Spill Kicked Off Anti-Pollution Era

“In 1969 the signs of . . . concern were everywhere,” writes John Quarles, EPA’s first deputy administrator, in the opening chapter of his invaluable memoir Cleaning Up America. These signs “were manifest in the outcry against the Santa Barbara oil spill,” which happened on January 28, 1969, just eight days after Richard Nixon’s ascent to the White House. There followed in close order a series of epochal events every month of that year. “Suddenly, in cities across the country, citizen environmentalists campaigned. . . . People were demanding a change in the old policy toward the nation’s resources.”

Welcome to our year-long celebration of the dawn of the environmental era, via a series of columns on the events of exactly a half century earlier.

We began in the last issue, with the Christmas 1968 creation of the Apollo 8 “Earthrise” photograph that was the first view people ever had of their whole planet, beautiful as a thin fragile shell of life against the foreground of the bone-dead moonscape. We will build toward the 50th anniversary celebration of the passage of the first modern environmental law, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the creation of the Environmental Law Institute the same day to help the new field grow.

“The year 1969 was truly a watershed year,” agrees Daniel A. Vallero in his revealing book Paradigms Lost: Learning from Environmental Mistakes, Mishaps, and Misdeeds, beginning when “a major oil well off the coast of Santa Barbara, California, blew out, spilling almost a million liters of oil and depositing tar onto approximately 50 kilometers of beach.” It was a disaster of biblical proportions, a sea coast painted black, and “a significant impetus to the environmental movement.”

The spill was definitely a result of human agency. Union Oil’s Platform A off the southern California coast was allowed to continue to pump crude by the U.S. Geological Survey, which “had given approval to operate the platform using casings that did not meet federal and California standards.” Oil platform workers struggled for 11 days to contain the surging spew of crude, as a slick 2,000 square kilometers in extent covered the ocean, much of it eventually washing up on the shore.

Dolphins died by the score, their blowholes contaminated. Birds were coated with oil; desperate crews worked to clean them, making national headlines, but less than a third of the treated birds survived. Detergents used to disperse the oil from the sandy beaches proved toxic to wildlife, worsening the toll. But Union Oil President Fred Hartley was sanguine: “I don’t like to call it a disaster, because there has been no loss of human life. I am amazed at the publicity for the loss of a few birds.”

In Washington, President Nixon watched the media coverage. The oil spill had become the major news story nationally, as the three major networks flooded the zone with 50 reporters, and members of Congress arrived to demand action. The day after the slick washed ashore, Nixon announced a complete cessation of drilling in federal waters off the California coast.

The oil spill provided nightly news coverage, with the desperate volunteer crews struggling to save wildlife and to steam-clean their beaches. On March 21, the president signalled he had had enough — he visited the site of the spill. Nixon flew in a helicopter over the large extent of the slick. He then landed on the beach of Santa Barbara, where he held an impromptu meeting with local residents that was heavily covered by the press. “The Santa Barbara incident has frankly touched the conscience of the American people,” Nixon told the crowd, promising a federal response.

According to Quarles, Nixon’s response to the Santa Barbara oil spill was to kick off a White House anti-pollution campaign that would be popular with the public. The incident did not ultimately produce a nationwide drilling ban, nor did it even end oil rigs off the California coast. But it was the first use of the 1968 National Contingency Plan for hazardous releases, showing that a governmental response to industrial pollution could be welcome. And three years later Congress protected all the “waters of the United States,” including the near-shore oceans, in passing the Clean Water Act overwhelmingly over Nixon’s veto. Why the president turned against a law he largely spawned is another story.

Notice & Comment is written by the editor and represents his views.

 

"Carbon dioxide is being added to the earth's atmosphere by the burning of coal, oil, and natural gas at the rate of 6 billion tons a year. By the year 2000 there will be 25% more CO2 in the atmosphere than at present. This will modify the ehat balance of hte atmosphere to such an extent that marked changes in climate, not controllable through local or even national efforts, could occur." 

— From “Restoring the Quality of Our Environment,” 1965 report to President Lyndon Baynes Johnson

 

Commercial Fishermen Sue Big Oil Over Emissions and Oceans

Commercial fishermen in California and Oregon sued dozens of oil and gas companies . . . for hurting the fishing market in the Pacific Ocean by raising temperatures on Earth.

The Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations is seeking financial compensation for its losses from 30 companies, including oil and gas supermajors, according to the suit filed in a California state court.

“It’s industry to industry, one harming another with the causal connection to prove it,” Noah Oppenheim, executive director of PCFFA, said in an interview. “Certainly we believe that the merits of the case are pretty clear and self-explanatory.”

Defendants in the case, including Exxon Mobil Corp., Chevron Corp., BP PLC, Royal Dutch Shell PLC and ConocoPhillips, have known for almost 50 years that burning fossil fuels warms the planet, the plaintiffs said.

Algal blooms, which can lead to a buildup of domoic acid in crabs, are scientifically tied to warming oceans. Because the acid is dangerous to people, human-caused warming is directly threatening the fishing industry, said Oppenheim, who has degrees in marine biology and marine policies.

“If the fishermen were causing this much harm to the public, we should get shut down,” he said.

E&E News

 

An Update on Last Issue's Lead Feature 

Juliana v. United States has been called the most important environmental case of the century. The 50-day trial was slated to start on October 29 in federal district court in Oregon, about the time our issue with coverage of the pretrial jousting hit the mail. However, the youths’ climate lawsuit was stayed by the Supreme Court. On October 19, Chief Justice Roberts issued an order that stopped the case until the plaintiffs responded to a Department of Justice motion to dismiss because the government argued that the complaint was overly broad, and that climate policy shouldn’t be decided by the judiciary.

DOJ asked for a rare writ of mandamus to stop the proceedings and argued that “In contrast to the obvious harms to the government, respondents can make no credible claim of imminent, irreparable harm. . . . Their alleged injuries stem from the cumulative effects of CO2 emissions from every source in the world over decades: whatever additions to the global atmosphere that could somehow be attributed to the government over the time it takes to resolve the pending petition are plainly de minimis.”

On October 22, the youths responded to the Trump administration’s application for a stay. Among other things, the plaintiffs argued that contrary to the assertions of the Trump administration, the trial would not intrude on the ability of the executive branch to carry out its functions and that there would be no confidential information disclosed. Moreover, they pointed out that the projected 50-day length of the trial and its costs were not enough to show irreparable harm to the government for purposes of a stay.

Importantly, the youngsters argued that Juliana is not an environmental case per se; instead, it is a civil rights case. The issue is not about the federal government’s failure to act on the climate. Rather, the kids asserted that it is through its affirmative decisions that the federal government created a national energy system that caused climate change that now deprives them of their constitutional rights to life, liberty, and property. Thus, the plaintiffs argued, the decision does not hinge on a newly recognized unenumerated fundamental right and that DOJ thereby has purposely misstated the essence of their case.

On November 2, Roberts issued an order lifting the stay and denied without prejudice the Trump administration’s petition for a writ of mandamus. Consequently, DOJ filed a motion for a temporary stay of the trial and another petition for a writ of mandamus with the 9th Circuit. The appellate court issued an order giving the youth plaintiffs 15 days to file a response to the government’s petition. The 9th Circuit also provided the opportunity for District Court Judge Ann Aiken to address the petition for mandamus within the same time window. Moreover, the youngsters and the Trump administration were ordered to file a joint report on the status of discovery and any relevant pretrial matters.

On November 21, Aiken stayed the case until the 9th Circuit issues its decision. She also certified her prior orders in the case for interlocutory appeal. It appears that the trial is unlikely to start in the very near future.

From a procedural point of view, this is “no ordinary case,” to quote the trial judge. The U.S. government apparently believes that this lawsuit is a judicial usurpation of power. The Trump administration has filed, thus far, four petitions for a writ of mandamus with the 9th Circuit, and two petitions with the Supreme Court. But the legal requirements of mandamus will typically not be granted if adequate relief can be obtained by some other means — such as an appeal.

Juliana v. United States has been stayed but not stopped.

Oil spill kicked off anti-pollution era.

How Best to Govern Geoengineering in the Race to Save Earth's Climate
Author
Robert N. Stavins - Harvard Kennedy School
Harvard Kennedy School
Current Issue
Issue
1
Robert N. Stavins

I want to comment on a topic that is rather controversial — at least among environmentalists and climate policy wonks — but at the same time is important: the governance of solar geoengineering deployment.

Solar geoengineering (which we’ll call SG) refers to the deliberate alteration of the Earth’s radiative balance in order to reduce the risks attributed to the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. According to my Harvard colleagues David Keith and Peter Irvine, technically plausible methods include adding aerosols to the stratosphere, where they reflect a small percentage of incoming sunlight back to space; adding cloud condensation nuclei, such as sea salt, to specific kinds of low-lying clouds over the ocean in order to increase their reflectivity or longevity; adding ice nuclei to high-altitude cirrus clouds in order to reduce their density; placement of space-based reflectors; and tropospheric aerosols.

Some types of SG will be associated with incentive structures that are the inverse of those associated with efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The latter is a global commons problem, which requires cooperation at the highest jurisdictional level (international) in order to advance significant mitigation. But, in contrast, certain types of SG can — in principle — be implemented effectively at relatively low financial cost — low enough to be borne by small states or even non-state entities acting on their own.

The impacts of such actions, however, might be substantial, at regional or even global scales. These could include the intended beneficial impacts — decreased global average surface temperatures — plus other, potentially adverse side effects. Given the incentive structure associated with SG, its potentially substantial impacts, and the uncertainty surrounding it, the governance of deployment will be challenging, to say the least, and is a very important topic for research.

With this in mind, last September the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements hosted a workshop on the “Governance of the Deployment of Solar Geoengineering,” with collaboration and support from Harvard’s Solar Geoengineering Research Program. Participants included 26 leading academic researchers addressing the workshop’s topic — as well as leading scholars who had considered the governance of other international regimes that might provide lessons and insights.

The workshop began with overviews of research on SG governance from two disciplinary perspectives — economics and law. Subsequent sessions addressed seven key questions, which arise, in part, from the incentive structure of SG governance.

First, who ought to or will specify criteria for SG deployment, and who ought to and/or is likely to decide when they are satisfied? Second, what will or should these criteria be? They might include regulations developed by policymakers; specifications by those who might engage in SG deployment; and physical, engineering, social, economic, ethical, and other perspectives. Third, how should decisions about deployment be made, and what decisionmaking process should or will be utilized?

Fourth, what institutions, either existing or new, are appropriate as decisionmaking venues? What will or should be the legal framework of such institutions? Fifth, how might SG complement or undermine national, regional, and multilateral institutions and policy to mitigate or adapt to climate change — and, more broadly, to manage climate risks? Sixth, SG is both a hedge against uncertain but potentially catastrophic risks of climate change, and has its own associated risks, known and unknown. How can we better understand these uncertainties and incorporate them into useful decisionmaking processes? Finally, how might we best define a research agenda for the governance of SG deployment?

In addition, a panel of international relations scholars discussed a set of global regimes — including nuclear arms control and cyber security — that may provide lessons for and insights into SG governance.

Given the very early stage of thinking about the issue, we did not attempt to provide definitive answers but sought to advance understanding of this issue and move the research community some steps further toward better identification of sound options for the governance of SG deployment.

Currently, each participant in the workshop is preparing a brief on an aspect of the topic of his or her interest. These briefs are designed to be readily accessible to environmental professionals — policymakers, climate negotiators, and leaders in the business and NGO communities. The entire volume will be released by the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements in February.

How best to govern geoengineering in the race to save Earth's climate.

Why Institutions Don't Respond to a Clear and Present Danger
Author
Craig M. Pease - Scientist and Law Professor
Scientist and Law Professor
Current Issue
Issue
1
Craig M. Pease

Politicians, lawyers, policymakers, and the popular media often focus not on scientific knowledge, but rather scientific uncertainty. Yet the cumulative knowledge codified within science, math, and engineering is immense.

The science and math of climate change have now been certain for over half a century. In the late 1950s, the science author Isaac Asimov calculated that “if the present carbon dioxide level should double, the overall temperature of the Earth should rise by 3.6°C.” Two decades later, the Charney report of the National Research Council concluded, “We estimate the most probable global warming for a doubling of CO2 to be near 3°C with a probable error of ± 1.5°C.” The most recent assessment from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is entirely consistent: “Equilibrium climate sensitivity is likely in the range 1.5°C to 4.5°C.”

The most pressing climate change problem does not concern scientific knowledge — which we have in spades — but rather institutional incompetence, which we also have in spades. Why is it that for many decades, science has accurately and consistently described the central climate change problem and offered sensible solutions, yet our legal, political, and social institutions have utterly failed to implement a solution?

Institutional incompetence is by no means unique to climate change. Even in the face of immense and obvious threats, large institutions are often remarkably resistant to sensible response. To cite one prominent example, by the early 1950s there was unassailable science showing cigarette smoking causes cancer, and yet today tobacco remains an immense global health scourge.

Thus, while we might criticize individual politicians or corporate officials for responding inadequately to climate science, I do not think that the fundamental problem lies either with individual bad actors, or with our not yet having found just the right statute, rule, or program to solve the climate problem. Lots of really smart and talented folks have taken a whack and gotten nowhere.

We need to dig deeper, viewing institutions as systems, and ask why large institutions have properties that seem consistently to cause them to fail to take appropriate action in response to scientific knowledge. Should not a large institution be able to marshal the brains and computational ability and rational analysis of all its members, to reach a course of action consistent with reason and science? Perhaps. But in my experience, and that of many other scientists, often large institutions do not.

One might offer diverse answers. One overlooked perspective is that in these battles of individual scientists and large institutions, one might compare the evolutionary history and system properties of a human brain versus a large institution.

The reason and rational analysis of science relies on the cerebral cortex. Logic is not easy or native for the human nervous system. But rational thinking is quite doable, with training such as received by any STEM graduate, and using various tools including computers, equations, and those found in any molecular genetics lab. Moreover, scientists collaborate a lot in small groups, thereby strengthening what a single individual might accomplish.

Critically, there has been strong evolutionary selection on the human brain, literally over the millions of years since we diverged from other primates (and indeed even before the divergence). Beyond that, for most of history, we lived in small groups, a form of social organization that also dates back millions of years and that evolved over time to help make humans successful ecological competitors. Thus, there has been considerable evolutionary pressure, responding to the feedback of natural selection, for small groups to make sensible decisions. Very roughly, human groups seem to make decent decisions provided group size is below the Dunbar Number of about 150 people.

In sharp contrast to the millennia of selection involving the brain and behavior in small groups, humans have only a few hundred years of experience with decisionmaking in large institutional structures such as parliaments, agency bureaucracies, multinational corporations, and certain large NGOs, which institutions often encompass literally millions of people. Observe that these large institutions that we ask to solve the problem of climate change are themselves creatures of the very same fossil fuels that have created the problem in the first place, as they arose and came to be dominant and pervasive only when humans learned to mine and use coal and oil over the last couple hundred years, causing our population to explode.

Critically, unlike the millennia of selective pressure on the human brain and small tribes, those large institutions have not been time tested and subject to any selective pressure. It is not at all surprising they are failing.

Why institutions don't respond to a clear and present danger.