<h4><em>Under review</em></h4>
<p>Legal efforts to address climate change, which is caused by <a href="#greenhouse-gas-emissions">emission of greenhouse gases</a>, started at the <a href="#international-initiatives">international</a> level with the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but have struggled to take root in the United States at the <a href="#federal-greenhouse-gas-efforts">federal</a>, <a href="#state-initiatives">regional and state</a> levels.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Listen to and download materials from the ELI seminar <a href="http://www.eli.org/events/summer-school-climate-change-introduction">Cl… Change: An Introduction</a>. ELI members can listen to ELI’s Monthly <a href="http://www.eli.org/events/monthly-climate-change-briefing-april-2015">C… Change Briefing</a> live or through archived files to follow the latest climate change law, policy, and management developments. For an in-depth discussion of climate change law, see Tom Mounteer, <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press-books/climate-change-deskbook">Climate Change Deskbook</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><a name="greenhouse-gas-emissions"></a>Climate change and greenhouse gas emissions</h3>
<p>Climate change resulting from human activity is one of the most pressing and high-profile environmental issues today. The <a href="http://www.ipcc.ch/&quot; target="_blank">Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</a> (IPCC) drew international attention to climate change in its <a href="http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/wg_I/ipcc_far_wg_I_spm.pdf&quot; target="_blank">1990 Assessment Report</a>, where it reported that increases in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions were causing substantial warming of the Earth’s surface beyond what would naturally occur. The IPCC’s “<a href="http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html&quot; target="_blank">Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change</a>,” released in 2007, stated unequivocally that human activities are <a href="#" title="Moreover, the IPCC found that “Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely [greater than 90% certainty] due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.”">causing</a> an increase in GHG concentrations: “The global increases in carbon dioxide concentration are due primarily to fossil fuel use and land use change, while those of methane and nitrous oxide are primarily due to agriculture.” U.S. government <a href="http://www.globalchange.gov/publications/371&quot; target="_blank">reports</a> concur with this assessment.</p>
<p>For a detailed discussion of the science behind climate change, see <a href="http://www.eli.org/eli-press-books/reporting-on-climate-change%253A-und… on Climate Change: Understanding the Science, 4<sup>th</sup> ed.</a></p>
<p><img src="/sites/default/files/images/taxonomy-climate-image-1.png" alt="Reconstructed Temperature" title="Reconstructed Temperature" border="0" height="369" width="500"><br>Figure 1 from IPCC Third Assessment. <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:1000_Year_Temperature_Comparison.png"…;
<p>Six main greenhouse gases drive climate change, with the most significant contributor being carbon dioxide. Global Warming Potential (GWP) is a relative measure of the amount of heat that a specific gas traps in the atmosphere over specified time periods.&nbsp; The GWP of carbon dioxide is 1 because it is the baseline unit to which all other gases are compared. Methane has a lifetime <a href="#" title="To really understand how GWPs work, it is important to note that GWP changes depending on the timeframe over which it is calculated. A gas that leaves the atmosphere quickly may have a large short-term warming effect – and thus a high initial GWP - but over the long term the GWP may fall significantly as the gas leaves the atmosphere. The converse is true for GHGs that stay in the atmosphere for a long time. Gases with the highest GWPs both trap a lot of heat and linger in the atmosphere for a long time.">GWP</a> of 12 which means that methane in the atmosphere has 12 times the warming potential as carbon dioxide.</p>
<table style="border-color: #000000; border-width: 1px; border-style: solid; width: 100%;" border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;" rowspan="2">
<p align="center"><strong>GWP values and<br>lifetimes from<br>2007 IPCC<br>Assessment</strong></p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p align="center"><strong>Lifetime</strong></p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;" colspan="3">
<p align="center"><strong>Global Warming Potential Time Horizon</strong></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p align="center"><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p align="center"><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p>
<p align="center"><strong>20 years</strong></p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p align="center"><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p>
<p align="center"><strong>100 years</strong></p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p align="center"><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p>
<p align="center"><strong>500 years</strong></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>Methane</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>12</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>72</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>25</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>7.6</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>Nitrous Oxide</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>114</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>289</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>298</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>153</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>HFC-23&nbsp; (hydrofluorocarbon)</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>270</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>12,000</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>14,800</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>12,200</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>HFC-134a (hydrofluorocarbon)</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>14</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>3,830</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>1,430</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>435</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>Sulfur Hexafluoride</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>3,200</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>16,300</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>22,800</p>
</td>
<td style="border-color: #000000; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px;">
<p>32,600</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Adapted from <a href="https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/ch2s2-10-2.html">h…;
<p>The human activities in the United States that contribute the largest portion of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere are electric power generation, transportation, industry, agriculture, and commercial buildings.</p>
<p><img src="/sites/default/files/images/taxonomy-climate-image-2.png" alt="Sources of Carbon Dioxide Emissions" title="Sources of Carbon Dioxide Emissions" border="0" height="274" width="500"></p>
<p>From <a href="http://elr.info//news-analysis/40/10547/implementing-behavioral-wedge-d…;
<p>While this list clearly illustrates that addressing greenhouse gas emissions requires efforts in the energy, transportation, building, industrial, and other vital economic sectors, everyday activities of the general population contribute significantly to GHGs as well:</p>
<p><img src="/sites/default/files/images/taxonomy-climate-image-3.png" alt="Sources of Green House Gas Emissions" title="Sources of Green House Gas Emissions" border="0" height="512" width="500"></p>
<p>From <a href="http://elr.info//news-analysis/40/10547/implementing-behavioral-wedge-d…;
<p>Thus, GHG regulation touches the entire economy and everyday choices we all make.</p>
<h3><a name="international-initiatives"></a>International Initiatives</h3>
<p>The <a href="http://unfccc.int/2860.php&quot; target="_blank">United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</a> (UNFCCC) was introduced in 1992 in an effort to control the emission of greenhouse gases that contribute to global climate change. The Convention established several principles for how the international would go about addressing climate change, including the notion that developed countries, who had contributed the most to global warming in the past, had a duty to take the lead in mitigating the adverse effects of climate change, also known as “common but differentiated responsibilities.” The parties to UNFCCC also agreed to develop national greenhouse gas emissions inventories, share scientific research and technology, and help create measures for climate change adaptation. None of these agreements, however, were legally binding.</p>
<p>In December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC established a binding commitment from 37 industrialized nations and the European Community to reduce <a href="#" title="Kyoto covers six greenhouse gases—CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, hydroflourocarbons, perflourocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.">GHG</a> emissions to an average of 5% below 1990 levels during the commitment period 2008 and 2012. These developed nations agreed to meet nation-specific targets to reduce their GHG emissions. In contrast, developing nations, even large developing nations such as India and China, were not required to meet emission reduction targets during this first round and would not be asked to meet emission targets.</p>
<p>In the summer of 1997, before the Kyoto Protocol was agreed to, the U.S. Senate on a 95-0 vote adopted a <a href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-105sres98ats/pdf/BILLS-105sres98ats…; target="_blank">resolution</a> to oppose any treaty that failed to impose similar duties on both developing and developed nations. Despite this vote, the U.S. president, Bill Clinton, signed the Protocol. However, the Protocol was never submitted to the Senate for ratification. By 2001, the United States announced that the Protocol would not be ratified. The Protocol entered into force in the ratifying countries on February 16, 2005.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a discussion of why the United States would not enter into the Kyoto Protocol and issues that constrain U.S. involvement in international efforts against climate change, see the suite of articles including Jody Freeman, “<a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/41/10695/climate-change-and-us-interests"… Change and U.S. Interests</a>” and a <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/41/10726/reply">reply</a&gt; with responses by <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/41/10724/review-freeman-and-guzman%E2%80%… Hopkins</a>, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/41/10720/critiquing-critique-climate-chan… Morgenstern</a>, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/41/10717/response-climate-change-and-us-i… Sheeran</a>, and <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/41/10712/comment-climate-change-and-us-in… Johnson</a> as well as Richard Cooper, “<a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/31/11484/kyoto-protocol-flawed-concept">T… Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept</a>” and Robert Nordhaus, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/30/11061/framework-achieving-environmenta… Framework for Achieving Environmental Integrity and the Economic Benefits of Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The Protocol put in place <a href="http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php&quot; target="_blank">three flexibility mechanisms</a> to help member countries reach emissions targets in addition to direct lowering of emissions: <a href="#" title="The emissions trading scheme is similar to the United States’ Clean Air Act Acid Rain Program. Under the Protocol, developed countries have an ‘assigned amount’ of allowable GHG emissions over the commitment period. Parties can buy and sell “assigned amount units” or other types of trading units, each of which correspond to the right to emit one CO2 equivalent ton.">emissions trading</a>, the <a href="#" title="The Protocol created the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which is the primary “offset” framework for helping industrialized countries achieve their reductions. In addition to reducing actual GHG output, industrialized countries can pay developing countries for certified emission reductions generated from projects that reduce GHG emissions in those countries—which is called an offset. CDM projects must show that the reductions achieved are above and beyond any that would otherwise occur—a concept called additionality. In other words, to get credit for reducing emission an investing country has to show the reduction was because of the collaboration and investment from an outside party and that but for that reductions would not have occurred. The CDM has met with significant controversy as implemented to date.">clean development mechanism</a>, and <a href="http://ji.unfccc.int/index.html&quot; title="Joint implementation allows two developed countries to transfer emission reductions.">joint implementation</a>.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a discussion of how offsets might work in the United States, see Kyle Danish, “<a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/40/10610/international-offsets-and-us-cli… Offsets and U.S. Climate Change Legislation</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The first compliance period of the Kyoto Protocol was 2008-2012. At the <a href="http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6825.php&quot; target="_blank">Durban conference of the parties</a>, this was extended. The parties <a href="http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf&quot; target="_blank">agreed</a> to negotiate by 2015 an agreement to take effect not later than 2020 that would involve both developed and developing countries to mitigate climate change and seek to keep global warming no greater than 2ºC.</p>
<p>As part of its effort to implement the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union has implemented perhaps the most advanced emissions trading scheme, the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm&quot; target="_blank">European Trading System</a> (ETS). <a href="#" title="ETS operates in 30 countries (27 EU member states plus the three additional members of the European Economic Area - Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) and applies to carbon dioxide (and some nitrous oxide) emissions from over 10,000 power plants, combustion plants, refineries, metal works and manufacturing facilities. In 2012, the aviation sector was added into the system, and in 2013 additional gases and industries will be added.">Europe’s</a> declared goal is for emissions in 2020 to be 21% lower than in 2005.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a discussion of California’s attempt to link to the ETS, see Hanna Chang, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/37/10771/foreign-affairs-federalism-legal… Affairs Federalism: The Legality of California's Link With the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><a name="federal-greenhouse-gas-efforts"></a>Federal Greenhouse Gas Efforts</h3>
<p>Congress has made multiple attempts to enact comprehensive greenhouse gas legislation, but so far no bill has passed both legislative houses. The most recent bill, the <a href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr2454eh/pdf/BILLS-111hr2454eh.pd… Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009</a> (H.R. 2545), was passed by the House only to die in the Senate. The Act’s central mechanism was an economy-wide<a href="#" title="What is a Cap-and-Trade and How Does it Work? A GHG cap-and-trade program establishes a market whose goal is to reduce GHG emissions. The “cap” sets a limit on emissions that regulated industries can release into the atmosphere. The amount of this limit is reduced over time thus reducing the total amount of GHG emissions. The “trade” is the market that is created to allow companies to innovate in meeting their emission limit. A company that is able to adopt new mechanisms to come in under their allocated emissions limit can sell their emission credits in the market. A company that is unable to meet their emissions target must purchase credits from the market. In this way, reducing GHG emissions is economically incentivized."> cap-and-trade program</a> for greenhouse gas emissions. Under such a program, a regulatory agency sets a maximum level for annual GHG emissions and distributes emissions allowances for a specified amount of <a href="http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=285">carbon dioxide equivalent</a>. Emitters subject to regulation must then reduce their emissions or acquire enough permits to cover their total output. The Act also included <a href="http://ase.org/resources/american-clean-energy-and-security-act-2009-ti…; target="_blank" title="Renewable Portfolio Standards set enforceable standards that require power providers to obtain energy from renewable sources. For example, in California, the goal is to have power providers in California use renewable energy sources for at least 33% of total power needs by 2020. The RPS works by 1. Setting and enforcing annual renewable energy procurement targets. 2. Approving the renewable energy procurement plans and reviewing renewable energy purchase contracts made by invester-owned utilities (IOUs). 3. Creating standard contract forms and conditions to be used by IOUs in making renewable energy purchases. 4. Determining market price referents (MPRs) for traditional, non-renewable energy sources to serve as benchmarks for pricing renewable energy.">renewable electricity generation standards</a>, a number of energy efficiency incentives, and support to industries that would be particularly affected by GHG regulation. Congress did <a href="http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bill…;, and EPA <a href="http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/ghgrulemaking.html">has implemented</a>, GHG emissions reporting.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a discussion of the Senate bills that addressed climate change, see Kenneth Richards, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/39/10601/comparative-analysis-climate-cha… Analysis of Climate Change Bills in the U.S. Senate</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>For one approach to getting Congress to act on climate, and a <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/40/10757/genius-versus-zombies-address-cl…; to that approach, see Richard Lazarus, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/40/10749/super-wicked-problems-and-climat… Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>For a discussion of the EPA reporting rules, listen and download materials from the ELI Seminar <a href="http://www.eli.org/ghg-reporting-rule-so-far-lessons-learned-and-change… Reporting Rule So Far: Lessons Learned and Changes to Consider</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The <a href="http://www.epa.gov/&quot; target="_blank">Environmental Protection Agency</a> is currently regulating GHGs under the <a href="http://www.eli.org/keywords/air-1">Clean Air Act</a><a href="#_msocom_16"></a>. While the Clean Air Act regulates many forms of air pollution, it does not mention GHGs by name. On October 20, 1999, a group of private non-profit organizations petitioned EPA to begin regulating greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act. After EPA determined that GHGs were not “air pollutants” subject to CAA regulation and denied the petition, these groups were joined by several states, cities, and citizens’ groups seeking review of EPA’s decision in federal court. In the landmark 2007 decision <a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16923241216495494762&amp;hl… v. EPA</em></a><a href="#_msocom_17"></a>, the <a href="http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS22665.pdf&quot; target="_blank">Supreme Court held</a> GHGs <em>can</em> be regulated under the Clean Air Act, and that the plaintiffs in the case had standing<a href="#_msocom_18">[SES18]</a> to sue EPA to ask the agency to begin regulating GHGs.</p>
<p>The result of the case was that greenhouse gases from mobile sources were officially considered “air pollutants.” Under the CAA, EPA was obligated to <a href="#" title="42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).">determine</a> whether they “cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger health or welfare.” In December 2009, the EPA Administrator issued an <a href="http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment/&quot; target="_blank">endangerment finding</a>, declaring that “six greenhouse gases taken in combination endanger both the public health and the public welfare,” and that emissions from new motor vehicles “contribute to the greenhouse gas air pollution.”</p>
<p>In light of the endangerment finding, EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), issued <a href="http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-8159.pdf&quot; target="_blank">regulations</a> in May 2010 regulating emissions of these GHGs from <a href="http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations.htm&quot; title="EPA and NHTSA have also proposed GHG emissions standards for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles that will apply to new vehicles beginning in 2014 and has proposed standards for cars and light trucks beyond 2017.">cars and light trucks</a> under Title II of the Clean Air Act.</p>
<p>With GHGs now regulated under the CAA, <a href="http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-04-02/pdf/2010-7536.pdf&quot; target="_blank">EPA’s interpretation</a> of the Clean Air Act requires it to develop permitting standards for new stationary sources that are major sources of GHGs, such as power plants or manufacturing facilities. EPA is promulgating and implementing regulations for such sources under the <a href="http://www.epa.gov/compliance/monitoring/programs/caa/newsource.html&qu…; target="_blank">new source performance standards</a> and <a href="http://www.epa.gov/nsr/&quot; target="_blank">new source review</a> provisions of the CAA. EPA’s efforts are the subject of significant political controversy and litigation, although challenges to the foundational EPA GHG rulemakings failed to gain traction in court.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For ELR articles addressing the ability of the Clean Air Act to tackle climate change, see Franz Litz, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/40/10480/what-expect-epa-regulation-green… to Expect From EPA: Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act</a>, Robert McKinstry, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/41/10301/clean-air-act-suitable-tool-addr… Clean Air Act: A Suitable Tool for Addressing the Challenges of Climate Change</a>, and Brigham Daniels, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/39/10837/regulating-climate-what-role-cle… Climate: What Role for the Clean Air Act?</a></p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>Listen to and download materials from the ELI seminar <a href="http://www.eli.org/dc-circuits-rulings-epas-greenhouse-gas-rulemakings"… D.C. Circuit’s Rulings on EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Rulemakings</a> to learn how the court upheld EPA’s regulatory program and watch and download materials from a seminar immediately after the court’s oral arguments at <a href="http://www.eli.org/debrief-dc-circuits-oral-arguments-epas-ghg-rulemaki…; target="_blank">Debrief of the D.C. Circuit’s Oral Arguments on EPA’s GHG Rulemakings</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>There are many other federal statutes and provisions that can be used to try to control GHGs, ranging from the <a href="http://elr.info/legislative/federal-laws/national-environmental-policy-… Environmental Policy Act</a> to the <a href="http://www.bdlaw.com/assets/attachments/Climate_Change_and_the_Clean_Wa…; target="_blank">Clean Water Act</a> and <a href="http://elr.info/legislative/federal-laws/endangered-species-act">Endang… Species Act</a> and presidential <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/2009fedleader_eo_rel.pdf&quot; target="_blank">Executive Orders</a>. In addition, some are trying to use the courts by arguing there are federal and state <a href="http://www.eli.org/keywords/governance#common-law">common law</a><a href="#_msocom_21"> </a>causes of action against emitters of GHGs as well as <a href="http://www.eli.org/keywords/governance#public-trust">public trust</a><a href="#_msocom_22"></a> doctrine claims.</p>
<h3><a name="state-initiatives"></a>State Initiatives</h3>
<p>States have taken various approaches to address climate change, including the formation of <a href="#regional-initiatives">regional programs</a><a href="#_msocom_23"></a> to address GHG emissions. Among states, <a href="#california-global-warming-solutions-act">California</a><a href="#_msocom_24"></a> has taken the most comprehensive steps toward GHG control, and many <a href="#local-initiatives">localities</a><a href="#_msocom_25"></a> have also undertaken GHG reduction initiatives.</p>
<h5><a name="regional-initiatives"></a>Regional Initiatives</h5>
<p>The <a href="http://rggi.org/&quot; target="_blank">Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative</a> (RGGI) in the Northeast was the first regional GHG reduction effort to be formed, followed by the <a href="http://www.wci-inc.org/&quot; target="_blank">Western Climate Initiative</a> and the <a href="http://www.c2es.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/mggra&quot; target="_blank">Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord</a>. RGGI, formed in December 2005, includes several states in the Northeast and the mid-Atlantic. The agreement applies only to fossil-fuel powered electric generators above a certain size, and covers only CO2 emissions. The core mechanism of RGGI is a market-based cap-and-trade program. The <a href="http://www.rggi.org/docs/Documents/RGGI_Fact_Sheet.pdf&quot; target="_blank">agreement</a> caps CO2 emissions at 2009 levels and requires regulated power plants to hold allowances for each ton of CO2 they emit using a cap and trade program. States are given broad discretion over many aspects of implementation, including initial allocation of allowances, permitting procedures, and exemptions for certain types of facilities. All states are required to direct some percentage of allowance auction proceeds toward energy reinvestment programs that benefit consumers. For example, Maine uses a portion of auction proceeds to subsidize construction of combined heat and power units to improve energy efficiency in factories. In May 2011, New Jersey indicated it is withdrawing from RGGI, and the state legislatures in other states have attempted to withdraw other states from RGGI.</p>
<p>Two other regions have begun to take steps toward implementing their own GHG reduction programs. The <a href="http://www.wci-inc.org/&quot; target="_blank">Western Climate Initiative</a> (WCI), comprising several western states and parts of Canada, was formed in 2007. However, Mexico, Arizona, Washington, Oregon, Montana and Utah have all recently withdrawn leaving only California and four Canadian provinces in the program. WCI intended to implement a cap-and-trade program, similar to RGGI, beginning in 2012, but that is no longer likely, although California may push ahead, perhaps with Canadian partners or on its own. . The withdrawn states have all joined <a href="http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/document-archives/general/North…; target="_blank">North America 2050</a>, a new initiative within WCI that does not include a cap-and-trade program. Seven Midwestern states and Canadian provinces formed the Midwestern Regional Greenhouse Gas Accord (MGGRA) and agreed to develop a <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20140522105252/http://michigancondemnationb…; target="_blank">regional cap-and-trade program</a>, but the initiative has stalled.</p>
<h5><a name="california-global-warming-solutions-act"></a>California Global Warming Solutions Act</h5>
<p>California passed the <a href="http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_32_bill_20…; target="_blank">Global Warming Solutions Act in 2006</a>, containing several major climate change initiatives. The Act’s overall goal is statewide reduction of GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. The <a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/homepage.htm&quot; target="_blank">California Air Resources Board</a> (CARB) is charged with developing and enforcing the implementing regulations of the Act, most of which are to become effective in 2012.</p>
<p>CARB’s <a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scopingplan.htm&quot; target="_blank">Scoping Plan</a> outlines the implementation of the Global Warming Solutions Act, including:</p>
<ul>
<li>A statewide <a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm&quot; target="_blank">cap-and-trade program</a> encompassing sectors that account for over 80% of GHG emissions</li>
<li>Stricter energy efficiency standards for <a href="http://www.energy.ca.gov/title24/2008standards/index.html&quot; target="_blank">buildings</a> and <a href="http://www.energy.ca.gov/appliances/&quot; target="_blank">appliances</a></li>
<li>An increase in required percentage of renewable electricity production under the state’s <a href="http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/&quot; target="_blank">portfolio standard</a></li>
<li>Higher <a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/zevprog/factsheets/advanced_clean_cars_eng…; target="_blank">fuel efficiency standards</a> for cars and light trucks</li>
<li>Low carbon <a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/lcfs.htm&quot; target="_blank">fuel standard</a></li>
<li><a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/energyaudits/energyaudits.htm&quot; target="_blank">Energy efficiency auditing</a> at industrial facilities.</li>
</ul>
<p>CARB has <a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/implementation/implementation.htm&quot; target="_blank">implemented</a> rules requiring <a href="http://arb.ca.gov/cc/reporting/ghg-rep/ghg-rep.htm&quot; target="_blank">GHG emissions reporting and verification</a> and identified “<a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccea/ccea.htm&quot; title="CARB has created nine early action regulations to reduce GHGs: • Low-carbon fuel standards • Methane capture from landfills • Reduction of HFC-134a, a hydroflourocarbon common in mobile air conditioning units • Reduction of GHGs produced by the semi-conductor industry • Multi-sector reduction of sulfur hexafluoride (the most potent GHG) • Limiting GHGs used in consumer products, such as aerosol propellants • Improving fuel efficiency for large semi-trucks • Regulations to encourage greater maintenance of car tire pressure to improve fuel efficiency. • Rules requiring docked ships to obtain power from sources other than their onboard diesel engines. Early Action Items (July 6, 2011).">early action items</a>” reduction measures that could be acted on quickly while the larger implementing regulations are under development.</p>
<p>To further support the goals of the Global Warming Solutions Act, California passed the <a href="http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_0351-0400/sb_375_bill_2…; target="_blank">Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008</a> and a companion bill <a href="http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_0701-0750/sb_732_bill_2…; target="_blank">Senate Bill 732</a>. The Sustainable Communites law requires ARB to develop regional GHG emission reduction targets for passenger vehicles and to establish targets for the State's 18 metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs). The MPOs are required to develop a <a href="http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/sb375/sb375.htm&quot; target="_blank">“sustainable communities strategy”</a> that will meet the emissions reduction targets through adopting sustainable land use, housing and transportation policies. Senate Bill 732 establishes and funds a <a href="http://sgc.ca.gov/&quot; target="_blank">Strategic Growth Council</a> to support these sustainable planning activities.</p>
<h5><a name="local-initiatives"></a>Local Initiatives</h5>
<p>Many localities have undertaken efforts to reduce GHG emissions, such as through the <a href="http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm&quot; target="_blank">U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement</a> and <a href="http://www.iclei.org/&quot; target="_blank">ICLEI</a>. Municipal government steps to address climate change have included developing climate change mitigation and adaptation plans, developing plans to encourage green development and encouraging new programs such as solar energy programs and energy efficiency drives that serve as models for other cities.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>For a discussion of the role of localities in climate law and policy, read Patricia Salkin,<a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/40/10562/cooperative-federalism-and-clima… Federalism and Climate Change: New Meaning to "Think Globally--Act Locally"</a> and Michael Burger, <a href="http://elr.info/news-analysis/39/11161/empowering-local-autonomy-and-en… Local Autonomy and Encouraging Experimentation in Climate Change Governance: The Case for a Layered Regime</a>.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3>Climate Adaptation Efforts</h3>
<p>While many efforts to address climate change focus on greenhouse gas emission reduction, also known as mitigation, adaptation to climate change is also an important aspect of climate change governance. Increasingly, federal, state and local governments are recognizing the importance of planning for a changing climate and the effects it will have on public health, the environment, and the built environment. For example, a Council on Environmental Quality <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/adaptation…; target="_blank">task force</a> developed recommendations for federal agencies to follow in integrating climate change adaptation planning into their regular planning activities. Many U.S. cities, such as <a href="http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/pdf/reed_presentation_11…; target="_blank">Chula Vista, CA</a>, and <a href="http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/pdf/engert_presentation_…; target="_blank">Keene, NH</a>, have begun the process of adaptation planning at the local level. <a href="http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/adaptatio…; target="_blank">International efforts</a> are also beginning to focus on <a href="http://www.eli.org/climate-energy/strengthen-capacity-adapt-climate-cha…; as well as mitigation.</p>

As Our Problems Out Race Our Solutions, Humanity Needs a Completely New Strategy
Current Issue
Issue
1
As Our Problems Out Race Our Solutions, Humanity Needs a Completely New Strategy

On the first Earth Day, in April 1970, Senator Edmund Muskie called for “a total strategy to protect the total environment.” We have had time to pull this off — nearly a half-century after Muskie’s clarion call — but have failed. Yes, gains in environmental quality have happened, but as time has passed, we have witnessed the emergence of global-level, existential threats. These include the thinning ozone layer, the crash of biodiversity, ocean acidity and the demise of top predator fish and coral ecosystems that spawn marine life, sea-level rise and the forced relocation of hundreds of millions of people, and of course the accelerating change in the Earth’s overall climate and the resulting change in weather patterns and spawning of monster storms.

The human race is pushing on or through what the Stockholm Resilience Center has called “planetary boundaries” with a certain reckless abandon even as the governance mechanisms needed to address these threats are under daily assault by anti-state activists and science deniers among the pundit class. The environmentalist Bill McKibben, commenting on last fall’s report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, observed that, “We’re running out of options, and we’re running out of decades.”

Over the past 50 years, society has pinned its hopes on a variety of actors: companies that have moved beyond compliance and embraced sustainability, cities pursuing novel strategies to meet urban environmental challenges, citizens mobilized with new technologies, from blockchains to big data to artificial intelligence. But none of these alone, no matter how well funded or motivated, can solve the environmental challenges we now face. As the IPCC concluded, the changes needed have “no documented historical precedent.”

What follows is a coming together of sorts that focuses on the bricks and mortar of a possible strategy to address our total environment at a time of urgent need. The discussion took place at the ELI-Miriam Hamilton Keare Policy Forum, with a panel of experts drawn from industry, academia, the legal community, and the public sector who discussed a preliminary sketch for a new environmental paradigm presented by ELI’s Scott Fulton and David Rejeski in the September 2018 edition of the Environmental Law Reporter.

Scott Fulton: Our purpose today is to talk about the emergence and convergence of some new and important drivers of environmental behavior and how to harness them and integrate them into a composite that helps us achieve the future that we all want. Two new drivers are private-sector environmental governance systems and technology.

To tee up this conversation, here is the central thinking from an article that our moderator, David Rejeski, and I wrote for the September 2018 edition of the Environmental Law Reporter entitled “A New Environmentalism: The Need for a Total Strategy for Environmental Protection.”

We came up with a chart to encapsulate our analysis. We put a vertical axis to reflect that some of the drivers are top-down in operation and some of them are bottom-up. We added a horizontal axis to reflect that some of the drivers are externally induced while others are internally motivated. That creates four quadrants. Each encapsulates and describes both a driver and a resultant system that emerges.

Working counterclockwise, let’s start at the quadrant in the upper right hand corner. In Quadrant 1, the driver is law and the system is traditional government action. Variations of command-and-control regulation are here.

In Quadrant 2 the driver is risk management and the system is private environmental governance that manages and reduces that risk — whether reputational or financial. This quadrant emerges from what we believe are enduring changes in the business orientation toward the environment. These are changes that derive from the environmental values that we carry into our jobs. These values are strongly reinforced by shareholder initiatives, desires for sustainability, and customer and supply chain demands. Managers increasingly regulate environmental behavior not only of their own operations but also of suppliers.

These values are reinforced by investor and insurer demands that perceive environmental challenges as financial risks. They are also driven by the opportunity to pivot from a risk-reduction orientation to brand enhancement, with green branding offering a marketing distinction. We should note that the accountability system associated with this quadrant is powerful. The levers are market access and access to finance, the very lifeblood of business.

In Quadrant 3, the driver is technology and the system is autonomous monitoring and correction. That includes systems that automatically change in the face of observed phenomena. In our article, we use the example of a sensor-based snowpack monitoring system in the Sierra Nevada. That in turn informs operation of a hydroelectric dam and the distribution of water resources for irrigation and human consumption. With the advent of artificial intelligence and blockchain approaches, it’s reasonable to expect that we’ll see self-monitoring systems proliferating in the future.

In Quadrant 4, the driver is Big Data. The system is a community platform for sharing those data and the stories that they tell. There is a data tsunami coming — we will all be monitoring our local air quality and the water we drink in much the same fashion that many of us monitor our heart rate and other biometrics.

Across these four quadrants, the drivers are going to operate in an interactive way. For example, data-based community pressures can be expected to influence behaviors in both private governance and public governance. Autonomous systems, to the extent that they are well designed and effective, can be expected to reduce the demand for the other three drivers. Effective private governance systems should in theory reduce the need for intervention by public governance mechanisms.

What is emerging will ultimately influence the shape of the governmental role going forward, and that’s ELI’s traditional area of engagement, partly because law-based systems in Quadrant 1 can either be barriers to or enablers of the evolution of the other three quadrants. Work needs to be done to ensure that law provides a supporting system for the changes we value.

But these other quadrants have attributes that relate to and may draw from government experience, in that they are in effect rules-based systems, built on contracts, preferred-sourcing criteria and sustainability criteria — even the social license to operate. The accountability mechanisms, ranging from denial of capital or market access, to product deselection, to public or social media rebuke, are different but nonetheless relatable to government compliance assurance systems.

Our moderator today is David Rejeski, who is the head of the technology initiative at ELI and came to us from the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the White House.

David Rejeski: I’m going to start with Michael Vandenbergh, who is the David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair of Law at Vanderbilt and a leading scholar on private environmental governance. He is the author of Beyond Politics: The Private Governance Response to Climate Change. Mike also runs a project at Vanderbilt on how to reduce carbon emissions at the individual and household level.

Michael Vandenbergh: From my perspective, the great ideas out there are only great if they can also be institutionalized. I would like to see more focus, particularly from an organization like ELI, on the institutional strategy that would push companies and communities toward a more sustainable, lower-carbon future. But what kinds of institutions are needed to move technology in the right direction? We can have all the best technologies in the world, but if the incentives are not right, companies won’t deploy them.

Much of what guides the way people think about the environment is worldview. How do you account for the effects of worldview on behavior in striving toward sustainability? That is a challenge that has bedeviled the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. I don’t know that you’re going to solve it, but a sophisticated incorporation of some kind of behavioral component would be a useful addition to the decisionmaking model.

David Rejeski: Ann Condon is now an ELI visiting scholar, after a long career at General Electric focusing on its chemical stewardship program and the company’s sustainability work.

Ann Condon: Among my challenges at GE was figuring out how to meet our greenhouse gas goals, how to green our supply chain, and how to deal with reporting on conflict minerals.

Attorneys are comfortable with public law. We’re even comfortable with private environmental governance. But Big Data, additive manufacturing, blockchain — it is all happening so fast. Lately people have been telling me how blockchain is going to solve sourcing traceability problems. But we need all four of Scott and David’s quadrants to enable a tool like blockchain to work. Because if you don’t have standardization in deploying it, there will be four thousand blockchain traceability systems: one for every platform.

Take the conflict-free sourcing initiative which involved a lot of work to standardize the data gathering. That was critical to ensure the material traceability efforts were usable. These common data fields have to be negotiated, which requires collaboration. Collaboration in turn requires organizations that can facilitate that standardization. It also requires a push from the regulators.

If we don’t figure it out, we are going to look back in five or six years and realize blockchain will be just like other initiatives, RFID comes to mind, that showed great promise but haven’t solved the problem. If you can get the data right, it can be very powerful.

David Rejeski: Michael Mahoney is Pfizer’s vice president and assistant general counsel, and chief environmental health and safety officer and compliance counsel. He’s also a member of the Environmental Sustainability Steering Council and the past chair of the Environmental Law Committee of the New York Bar Association.

Michael Mahoney: I started at Pfizer as an environmental engineer in the mid 1980s. I spent most of my time helping the company comply with command-and-control regulations. It was never perfect because of the nature of the way the regulations were promulgated, but we worked hard to comply.

In the mid 1990s we witnessed the birth of private governance. I was very fortunate to be involved in the drafting of our environmental, health, and safety standards. We did it because we thought it was the right thing to do.

In 2006 we developed our environmental sustainability program. We went to management and sold it as the right thing to do. But we also sold it as a means to differentiate Pfizer from our competitors.

Today, we are beginning to see customers, including large governmental buyers, become more interested in our environmental footprint. Those companies that have good programs are going to be selling to these entities and those that don’t will not. The market opportunity is developing very quickly. It’s driving companies to action. But to succeed a company needs to have a solid program, including how it manages its supply chain.

We need a system where all these drivers are working in harmony. That would be the most efficient and effective. But in the meantime we should leverage those drivers for the opportunities they currently present.

So I would emphasize the market as a driver. Customers are demanding sustainability throughout the supply chain.

David Rejeski: Adrienne Hollis is both an environmental toxicologist and an environmental lawyer. She works on environmental justice issues and is director of federal policy in the D.C. office of WE ACT for Environmental Justice. I’ll ask her to give the perspective from a community level.

Adrienne Hollis: David and Scott’s article resonates with me both from a scientific perspective and also from a legal perspective.

Because I work with environmental justice communities, I look at it through that lens. In a perfect world, we would be touching all four quadrants equally. But there are some factors that people normally don’t take into account in such an analysis, and that’s the trust of the community.

In Quadrant 1, the role of government is to promote the will of the majority while protecting the rights of the minority. That really hasn’t happened, at least not recently. In this administration we see a shift away from legislation designed to protect the public. Privatization is also a big issue for communities. It is not just an economic issue, but an economic justice issue as well.

I want to talk about the need for community science. We used to call it citizen science, but it is really community science because we’re talking about exposure to everyone. Perfect examples are the immigrant camps and the people who are situated next to facilities that may be emitting toxic substances.

But I need to speak about the fact that science is under attack. It makes me question the fourth quadrant. Until we can reach a point where we respect the data, that quadrant is definitely at risk. The whole theory of the four quadrants is at risk.

David Rejeski: John Lovenburg is the environmental vice president for BNSF Railway. His portfolio includes remediation, hazardous material sustainability, environmental litigation, compliance, environmental permitting, agency engagement, environmental engineering, and environmental policy.

John Lovenburg: The four quadrants appear to be an accurate representation of what we are seeing in the environmental space. A good example of where integration is occurring is in data.

For instance, there are now very active community air monitoring programs. High school students are doing air monitoring. Agencies are doing mobile air monitoring. The result is a real explosion of data.

While there are obvious opportunities, from industry there is some initial reluctance. So from a public governance role, there is a real value in the agencies building the confidence of all of the stakeholders to trust the data.

I was a consultant during the 1990s and 2000s. We spent a lot of money collecting highly precise, very expensive data points. With current technologies, we’re collecting hundreds of data points very cheaply and very rapidly. As we get our arms around that data, the level of confidence among all stakeholders is going to go up.

As to private governance, for BNSF, environmental management systems are our way of internalizing all of the external systems — best practices, audits, corrective actions. I tell my team that if they find an error, use that as an opportunity to find potential system-wide fixes. This flips the usual attitude on its head. We are looking for errors so we can turn them into positives for the whole organization.

This is one way that private governance takes governance to an nth degree above an external system alone. For us the ratio is probably twenty to one: faults that we find internally through audits and other means versus problems a regulator may find during an inspection.

So in terms of what’s missing from this ecosystem of drivers, in Quadrant 2, included is managing risks, but there is also opportunity in discovering and handling issues.

A good example is TCFD, the new carbon reporting framework put together by the G20 nations. TCFD, the task force for climate-related financial disclosure, looks at opportunities and risks around climate. It is the first model that I have seen that dispassionately looks at policy, carbon pricing, physical risks, and impacts on markets.

Balancing risk and opportunity would be a good addition to the framework.

Second, I would add sustainability and sustainable solutions as the best way to find common ground.

I am co-leading an initiative with the railroad around electrification. It is a win-win because electric vehicles have triple the efficiency of internal combustion vehicles. That means using two-thirds less energy to move trains, trucks, cargo-handling equipment, et cetera.

Our team is charged up around BNSF’s electrification initiative because it is a sustainable solution. We eliminate onsite emissions, because we get electricity from offsite power plants. We can cut operating costs by two-thirds. We’re going to use fewer resources. We’re going to reduce our carbon footprint. That’s a perfect example of a sustainability win-win solution, and why I would add it to this framework.

David Rejeski: Paul Hagen practices both U.S. and international law as a partner at Beveridge & Diamond. He also works with corporations and trade associations.

Paul Hagen: Most of my work is in the product stewardship space. Our orientation creates a race to the top, because there is often a market access driver. The EU requires the electronics sector to fully understand what is in their products and to create a timeline for eliminating certain restricted substances. Today, whether you’re selling products in Vermont or Beijing, you have to orient yourself around global market access requirements and supply chains. We’ve seen what happens with conflict minerals as a for instance across the economy.

But the legal infrastructure that we’re working with is cumbersome and often antiquated. If we look at the four quadrants, and the evolution of data in driving technology solutions, in promoting environmental governance, those don’t operate in a vacuum. They operate in a world with disparate countries’ laws and international legal frameworks.

I spend a lot of my time working on the circular economy. Companies are committed to extending the life of products through repair and reuse. By reusing products, materials, and recycling, we really take advantage of those environmental and economic benefits at scale. Some of that is being driven by the EU, but a lot is driven by scarcity and efficiency interests.

Unfortunately, we are moving used and end-of-life products across international borders under a 30-year-old environmental treaty that the United States has not ratified. I have sat in the back of the room with U.S. government and other non-party observers to the Basel Convention on hazardous waste, watching as other governments decide how we’ll classify and move used products across frontiers.

One of the areas the circular economy focuses on is the reuse of plastics. In an effort aimed at minimizing plastic pollution, Norway has proposed bringing a larger universe of waste plastics under control under the Basel Convention. For parties to the Convention, it is a question of controlling certain shipments. But because the United States is a non-party, that’s really an import and export ban for us. The United States is operating in a legal framework that’s entirely different from the other 185 countries because we are a non-party.

It is hard for companies to innovate and for NGOs to collaborate if the legal infrastructure is not keeping up. So don’t overlook the importance of that legal quadrant. It’s the one on which these other dynamics can be built and operationalized.

David Rejeski: It’s time to bring in the audience, and I know Douglas Keare has a question.

Douglas Keare: I was pleased that the last three speakers focused on risk in the system. The consideration of risk in private-sector governance, whether financial or reputational, is nowhere even in the ballpark of the kinds of risk we should be paying attention to.

There are two factors that motivate me to stress this. The first is an excellent article by Henry Kissinger in The Atlantic, which is spurred by the headlong rush into artificial intelligence. It concentrated on the fact that science and technology, each motivated by their own monsters, are rushing to the future without restraint because what we have is an exponentially widening gap between what science and technology are discovering and our ability to understand it, let alone manage it or control it, and that’s not sustainable. The second factor is that some of the directions they’re rushing in are not desirable.

I am in favor of linking opportunity and risk. Maybe the way to look at the diagram is that it ought to be a pentagon rather than a square. The fifth section should be managing or identifying and avoiding existential risk but doing it within an opportunity framework such that a new technology emerges somewhere in the system.

Dave Rejeski: Gary Marchant of Arizona State University raises what he calls the pacing problem — to what extent can the legal framework of Quadrant 1 keep up with the rate of change — whether the instrument of change is AI, or blockchain, or anything else. Every time we discuss the issue of science and tech and the existential risks they raise, we find we are unable to figure out how to make this system change. Michael Lewis in his new book The Fifth Risk raises the issue of the way governments deal with existential risk.

Michael Vandenbergh: The overall goal of the system is to avoid catastrophic risk. Any chart like this assumes roughly an equilibrium status moving forward with growing GDP. If you take that away, then boom, everything goes haywire.

In terms of transitions, you can argue about what the Founders thought concerning how information would flow in a democracy and how that has changed. With today’s technology, if you wish you will only hear one side of what used to be an impartial presentation of the day’s events. That makes structuring a democratic discourse on environmental protection difficult. The very ability of governance systems, whether public or private, to function is being directly affected by developments in technology.

David Rejeski: Dan Hillis, who was one of the people who invented parallel computing, recently wrote an article titled “The Enlightenment is Dead, Long Live the Entanglement.” His thesis is that we are all essentially entangled with one another — through our machines and our organizations. That is going to lead to behavior that is difficult to predict and govern and to indeterminacy in a legal system.

Michael Vandenbergh: Many of us may not know that household electricity use has gone down in the last couple of years for the first time since World War II. A recent economics paper shows that the decline correlates almost perfectly with the introduction into the market of attractive, low cost LED light bulbs. Why did that happen? It happened partly because of government.

Ann Condon: “Ban the Bulb.”

Michael Vandenbergh: Indeed — government had a role but also companies like Walmart said if you can make one under $10 that looks good, we’ll sell it. So the manufacturers played a role as well. None of this was anticipated.

Paul Stern: I’m Paul Stern, working nowadays at the Social and Environmental Research Institute. But after a long career at the National Research Council, where I was a director in a number of projects in some of these areas, I wanted to focus on the issue of data in Quadrant 4 and the question about whether we’re getting a tsunami of information. Data are useful when they’re trusted and trustworthy. Data producers may be biased. They may be perceived to be biased. You want good data and you want trust for good data in order to inform decisionmaking.

I see this as an institutional challenge. How do you design institutions that allow the various parties interested and affected by decisionmaking to have data that they trust and that they ought to trust?

John Lovenburg: Let’s talk about corporate use of data. I received an updated number from our technology VP just two days ago. We generate 35 million readings per day from the sensors that we have on the railroad — thermal, acoustic, hyperspectral, cameras on locomotives, cameras in yards, drones flying over track. We use these sensors for safety, efficiency, and environmental purposes.

After track construction, you plant native vegetation to restore the ecosystem. The way we used to do it is to hire a biologist who would over the course of a week look at 30 miles of new track. Now we are flying a drone in ten minutes over the same area. It uses infrared cameras that plug into agricultural algorithms — and I can get quantitative data on restoration progress.

The issue of trust comes up when there are shared data. With air quality data, there can be skepticism among multiple parties that there could be the needed level of trust. With time, we’ll build some confidence. When you have overlapping data that produce the same answer, you start building confidence in the system. That speaks to the role agencies can play, to step in and help multiple parties adjudicate that data and build confidence.

Adrienne Hollis: On the issue of trust — people are going to have their own agendas. When communities are able to participate in data gathering, and to develop guidelines, that generates trust.

There are now personal air-quality monitors that update in real-time. In practice, ten people in the same community who were exposed to the same pollution plume and suffered adverse health effects would have a response to an industry monitor that says there was no release above the government standard.

So whom do you trust? Do we need to get people to agree that there is one particular trusted source of information that we all must acknowledge? Or do we say there’s a certain protocol that must be followed in order for data to be seen as valid?

Scott Schang: I’m Scott Schang with Landesa and formerly with the Environmental Law Institute. One point and two questions.

I wonder if we’re missing a driver in the form of private capital from philanthropies and unaccountable political donations that these days has such a force.

I wonder what this would look like if you did it in a developing world context. Is it the same map? Maybe it is but I’m not sure. Will it look like this in China, India, Myanmar, and Malawi? It might be interesting to ask that question, because it might inform our thinking about what our system looks like.

And then, finally, resources. What happens in each of these four quadrants when you resource them or don’t resource them? I would argue the only one of the four that is really resourced is technology. The other three, including private environmental governance, are largely starved because companies aren’t really putting much money into it.

Ann Condon: Can I weigh in on the developing country aspect? Because the model, maybe not the specifics of AI or Big Data, but of sustainable business tools, is actually even more important in many respects in the developing world because some of the other institutions aren’t very strong. There may be different tools in the buckets, but the concept is right.

Scott Schang: Where I work in the developing world, it’s the government that is acting as the business promoter, trying to get land to companies, and the companies are being asked to act like the government by providing basic social services and the environmental rule of law. So the roles have been exactly swapped and I wonder if that’s where we’re headed in the United States as well.

Holly Elwood: I’m Holly Elwood. I work at EPA. And for me, looking at the quadrants, I see my work very much 100 percent in the left quadrants. We are thinking of it as purely where the private sector lives, but there’s a really strong role for the federal government there. And as purchasers, as developers of product sustainability standards that we use to meet our sustainable procurement requirements, that’s a place where trust is absolutely vital.

I am glad you brought that topic up because without it no one will use those standards or eco-labels and we won’t be able to get to an agreed understanding of what we are trying to make happen in the market. I see a lot of work happening in that space right now and a lot of engagement from the private sector.

Michael Vandenbergh: I couldn’t agree more. You could argue that the disclosure of the Toxics Release Inventory data was one of the drivers for what you see in the private sector. As to trust, maybe this is a place where the public and the private side come together. Maybe it is time for a certification and standards system that applies to community-based data. That’s a place where the private sector might play a role if the public sector can’t.

Paul Hagen: Holly raises an excellent point in that this is a domain where there is a lot of evolution, a lot of action, particularly in the green-electronics space. There are expanding product certification schemes. There are governance issues. There are green procurement requirements.

The government is learning and adjusting. The private sector is learning and adjusting. The NGO community is trying to figure out how to come up with what Scott has described as the optimal solution space. Lawyers are not used to dynamic systems, where you have steady adjustments over time rather than etchings in stone.

Unfortunately, even the best private environmental governance schemes are operating at a scale that might be noteworthy but ultimately is insufficient.

Instead, we need to appreciate the role of governments. If we can come up with an approach with all the OECD governments, for example, it might take a little bit more time, but it would operate at a larger scale. Instead of letting one jurisdiction, for example, set the energy-efficiency standard for a product and everybody else has to fall in line because it’s a global marketplace, there is more of a collaborative process across multiple OECD countries. And then we could roll that standard or framework into the developing world.

David Rejeski: The trust issue actually goes through all four quadrants. I had an interesting discussion with somebody at the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency. DARPA has a group focused on explainable AI. One of their big worries is the machine learning algorithms are starting to make decisions that they can’t explain to the humans. Do we trust the algorithm? If you’re the decisionmaker in a company or you’re a CIA analyst, it’s a huge issue of whether this machine learning algorithm has told you something you didn’t know.

Thomas McHenry: I am the dean and president of Vermont Law School. This has been a fascinating discussion. It makes me wonder. Three quarters of our students come to Vermont Law School because they’re interested in pursuing careers in environmental law. What should we be teaching to allow students to take advantage of this paradigm?

Ann Condon: I have hired many legal interns over the years. Teaching environmental law is an important foundation, but a lot of folks that I see coming out of these very specialized environmental programs do not understand basic contracts. They don’t understand commercial relationships, including antitrust law. If lawyers don’t have that essential business background, they can’t integrate the environment into core business strategies.

Michael Mahoney: I would add that building a business case is vital to embedding sustainability in an organization. It is important that lawyers have the fundamentals in business and in finance. Students coming out of a sustainability background can really move a program if they have the tools. They can work with the right people in the company, explain where the trend is going, then make a business case. But lawyers coming out of school don’t have those basic tools. I didn’t when I graduated. I often think of going back and getting an MBA, because I think it is important to marry that with law.

Michael Vandenbergh: I published a short piece called “The New Private Advocacy” last fall that is directed at private lawyers. It is designed to do what you are saying. This is not just happening in law. I talked to a manager of one of the big environmental groups not long ago, and he told me he had to find a bunch of new people who understand the supply chain contract for bananas. It wasn’t enough to know which Senate committee did what. A complete lawyer today is someone who understands the public and the private side of environmental governance and knows all those different instruments.

Cross-training is really helpful. We teach a class with MBA students and law students together. They have to figure out how to interact with one another. That helps because their thinking patterns are so different.

Monica Medina: I now run a small environmental newsletter called Our Daily Planet, but I was in the government for a long time in and out many administrations.

The world of weather data is highly advanced and is a useful model. There may be lessons that could be learned from the way the World Meteorological Organization has pulled together science and business and created products and tools that we all know and use. The European model is more accurate potentially than the U.S. model, but the point being that there are a lot of data that have been collected for a long time on weather. The data sit in the government but are shared very well. There is an infrastructure in place to allow government-to-government sharing even with governments we don’t get along with.

Dave Rejeski: One of the earliest citizen science projects was connecting citizen meteorologists together via the telegraph. That was the Victorian Internet. It led to breakthroughs in forecasting. The Weather Service has been able to take legacy data from a century ago and integrate it with current data and use that for prediction. Weather forecasting is an area to look at for models, for anyone who is trying to learn how to do data integration, aggregation, and basically how to use distributed networks of both human and other types of sensors including satellites.

Unidentified Questioner: I have a question on the impact of what’s happening in Quadrant 1 on Quadrant 2. I speak as someone who spent the last 28 years in Quadrant 1. In the United States, as resources are being radically cut at the federal level and even as the legitimacy and role for environmental regulations are being questioned, will that have an effect on the demand in Quadrant 2 on the private side? I would like to think not­ — that reputational risk and financial risk will grow regardless of what is happening again at the national level in Quadrant 1. But am I being too hopeful?

Ann Condon: Standardization may drive the process here. When there are lots of conflicting requirements, product manufacturers will say, “Now we need to standardize.” Because if you have the Ohio rule and California rule and the Beijing rule, it almost becomes impossible for a manufacturer to figure out. If the federal government isn’t going to do it, then we need to have a private effort. That is when you get the push for private environmental governance.

Paul Hagen: Most of the folks we work with say they like a robust regulator because they can occupy an important part of the conversation. Even with the most well-regarded companies or NGOs, there’s always a conversation to frame.

John Lovenburg: We often get customers who will ask for carbon emissions data. We normalize our emissions by weight transported. If they want it normalized by volume, there is a disconnect. A different language is being spoken.

So BNSF is involved with EPA SmartWay and the Smart Freight Centre, all striving to come up with a single way of normalizing supply chain transportation carbon emissions.

Dave Rejeski: I spent yesterday with the Food and Drug Administration, which was having two days of meetings to create an enabling environment for the next 20 years of protein development. I was stunned with the foresight that FDA had. They’re listening to technology developers and creating an enabling environment. That could be setting standards, thresholds for data collection, whatever.

Michael Mahoney: If industry sees a reason to standardize because they see that the environment needs to be better protected, they can go a long way toward building the framework for a program that the government might step in and implement more widely. This is thus a great opportunity for partnership, where the industry can do some of the work until the government has the information and resources it needs.

Michael Vandenbergh: Lawyers can serve an enormously important role. One of the greatest benefits we bring to the table is that we’re comfortable working with environmental engineers and physicists and others. That’s a role ELI can continue to play as the field goes from being essentially a subfield of administrative law to something much broader.

We might think here as an institution about how to create convening settings where people from lots of different disciplines can work on common problems. This conversation was a start. TEF

On the first Earth Day, in April 1970, Senator Edmund Muskie called for “a total strategy to protect the total environment.” We have had time to pull this off — nearly a half century after Muskie’s clarion call — but have failed. Yes, gains in environmental quality have happened, but as time has passed, we have witnessed the emergence of global level, existential threats. The human race is pushing on or through what the Stockholm Resilience Center has called “planetary boundaries.” The old approaches have failed. But what would a new paradigm, built on lessons learned, look like?

Be Prepared!
Author
Joel Scheraga - Environmental Protection Agency
Environmental Protection Agency
Current Issue
Issue
1
Be Prepared!

Communities across the United States are coping with more frequent and intense storms, droughts, heat waves, coastal storm surges, wildfires, and sea-level rise. These events are having costly impacts on public health, the environment, and local economies. City, state, and federal budgets are being over-stressed, as resources are increasingly being spent on emergency response and, then, rebuilding activities. Since 1980, the United States has incurred over $1.5 trillion in damages from weather and climate disasters, each of which cost at least $1 billion. 2017 was the most expensive year on record, with $306 billion in total damages. The economic impacts have become so severe that the vulnerability of local communities to future impacts is now influencing credit ratings for municipal bonds.

Mayors, county executives, and other local government officials are becoming increasingly aware of the need to anticipate and prepare for these events, particularly since they are expected to occur more frequently, and in some cases with increased intensity, as the Earth’s climate continues to change. Also, local government officials whose communities are rebuilding following major disasters (a major hurricane; a wildfire) increasingly recognize the benefits of “rebuilding smarter” so their communities are more resilient to future impacts. They understand that adaptation is smart government and helps ensure investments made with scarce taxpayer dollars are effective even as the climate changes. The National Institute of Building Sciences estimates investments in climate resilience and adaptation can save the nation six dollars in future disaster costs for every dollar spent on hazard mitigation.

Anticipating, preparing for, and adapting to a changing climate is also critically important for environmental protection. Many of the outcomes EPA, in partnership with states, tribes, and local communities, is trying to attain — clean air, safe drinking water, Superfund remediation — are sensitive to weather extremes and future changes in climate. For example, more frequent and intense storms can cause combined sewer systems to overflow, spilling raw effluent into rivers and streams. Sea-level rise and storm surges can inundate Superfund sites, increasing the risk that toxic material will be released into the environment and local neighborhoods. More intense and prolonged heat waves can increase tropospheric ozone pollution in certain regions and make it more difficult to attain health-based air quality standards.

Some communities are already acting. The Massachusetts Water Resources Authority anticipated the impacts of climate change when it redesigned and upgraded the Deer Island Wastewater Treatment Plant in Boston Harbor between 1989 and 1998. It recognized that sea levels would rise over the lifetime of the facility (through 2050), and thus it would be prudent to adapt the design to protect the $3.8 billion investment. The MWRA raised key portions of the facility by 1.9 feet in anticipation of future increases in sea levels.

Investments like these are already yielding significant benefits. Washington, D.C., has a combined sewer system that dumps raw waste into the Anacostia River when the capacity of the system is exceeded during severe storms. New controls that will be completed by 2023 are being put in place that will reduce the risk of overflows. As part of this effort, a new seven-mile-long, 23-foot-wide tunnel was completed last March. During its first two months in operation, it prevented overflows that would have poured about a billion gallons of raw sewage into the Anacostia, leading into the Potomac River near the national capital’s key monuments and then into endangered Chesapeake Bay.

Despite these proactive efforts, many communities across the country are still struggling to adapt. Coping with climate risks can be particularly challenging for middle- to smaller-sized communities, which often lack the technical expertise and experience with anticipating and preparing for the future impacts of climate change. They also often have limited resources to devote to climate adaptation.

In 2016, the Environmental Protection Agency launched an innovative web-based Climate Change Adaptation Resource Center to help all 40,000 communities across the nation anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to the impacts of climate change. Located at epa.gov/arc-x, what we call ARC-X is designed to support local government officials throughout the country, from those with extensive experience and expertise dealing with the impacts of climate change, to those working in communities just beginning to meet those challenges. The goal, consistent with EPA’s mission and statutes, is to help ensure localities continue to protect public health and the environment even as the climate changes.

There is, in fact, already a huge volume of information available to help decisionmakers understand the risks climate change poses to the things they care about, and to develop and implement adaptation strategies. Websites such as the U.S. Climate Resilience Toolkit, Georgetown Climate Center, Climate Adaptation Knowledge Exchange, Kresge Foundation “Climate Adaptation: The State of Practice in U.S. Communities,” ICLEI Local Government Climate Adaptation Toolkit, and others are rich with information. The problem is that these websites often contain a wide array of disparate information which can be overwhelming for a decisionmaker with limited or no experience dealing with climate adaptation. It can be challenging for officials to integrate the different types of information available in any of these sites into a single package that will provide them with a complete recipe for how to evaluate and prepare for the risks posed by climate change.

In meeting this challenge, the ARC-X is unlike any other resource currently available to the public. The ARC-X provides users with an integrated package of information tailored specifically to their needs, based on where they live and the issues of concern to them. Users are given an opportunity to self-identify by indicating the region of the country in which they live and the specific issues of concern to them. The system then provides them with a complete package of information that includes insights about the implications of climate change for the things they’ve indicated they care about in their region and their community; adaptation strategies to address the risks posed by climate change; case studies that illustrate how other localities with similar concerns have already successfully adapted, along with instructions on how to replicate their successful efforts; tools available from EPA to help implement the adaptation strategies; and sources of funding from EPA and other federal agencies. Users can follow a thread through the package, eliminating the need to figure out how all the relevant information fits together. The ARC-X does that for the user.

To help ensure the effectiveness and usefulness of the ARC-X, the agency sought input from potential users as soon as it began designing the system. EPA engaged its Local Government Advisory Committee, whose members include mayors, county executives, and other administrators. The agency also benefitted from comments received in other forums. Several key insights emerged from these discussions.

For instance, we learned that local government officials are overwhelmed by the multitude of websites containing huge volumes of information, much of which is irrelevant to the issues of concern to them. In too many cases, policymakers must search for and piece together the specific information of interest to them. This is a particularly serious problem for the thousands of officials with limited or no expertise with climate adaptation.

The tendency of websites to overwhelm users with information not relevant to their needs was starkly illustrated by a county executive trying to sift through the wide array of adaptation tools that have been developed. The official stated at a climate leadership conference, “We don’t need any more stinkin’ tools. What we need is the technical assistance to understand which tools are the right ones for us to use given the issues of concern to us, and the technical assistance to understand how to use the tools.” For this reason, the ARC-X system was designed to first elicit the specific issues of concern to the user, and then provide relevant information in a manner that meets this official’s needs.

Policymakers also wanted a system that is non-prescriptive. Local government officials need a resource that will inform their decisions, not tell what the decisions should be. It is the prerogative of the communities to decide what, if any, adaptive measures they want to take.

In that vein, there is no question that adaptation is smart government and helps local agencies deliver critical services to their communities even as the climate changes. For example, it helps ensure investments made with scarce taxpayer dollars to clean up Superfund and brownfield sites are resilient to future extreme weather events. But the future is uncertain and decisions about the margins of safety communities want to build into their systems are value-laden choices that must be made by local government officials given available resources. Do they want to ensure Superfund remediation is effective if a 100-year storm hits, or do they want to be more risk averse and spend to prepare for the possibility of a 500-year storm? These are social choices. The challenge is to empower community leaders to make more informed decisions.

“Thank you so much for developing a program . . . from the bottom up, instead of the top down,” Mayor Bob Dixson of Greensburg, Kansas, told us upon reviewing the completed ARC-X system. “It is more receptive to all areas of the United States than . . . just what the Beltway says is going to happen.”

The functionality of the ARC-X system can be illustrated with a real-world problem confronting many coastal communities: the potential impacts of sea-level rise and storm surge on wastewater treatment plants located along the coast. For our illustration, let’s assume the user is a mayor in a small coastal community in the Northeast who is new to thinking about climate change adaptation. The community’s wastewater treatment facility is already protected from flooding by a seawall, but the mayor is concerned the level of protection it provides may prove inadequate in the future. Unfortunately, the community lacks the necessary expertise to assess the risks posed by sea-level rise and worsening storms to develop adaptation strategies.

Let’s follow the thread that leads the mayor through the ARC-X system. When the mayor enters the portal, she is immediately presented with a “Tailor Your Search” option to have the system deliver a complete package of information designed specifically to her needs. She is then asked to self-identify by indicating the geographic region in which her community is located (since impacts vary by region) and citizens’ specific issues of concern. The areas of interest from which she can choose are those related to EPA’s statutory authorities and mission of protecting public health and the environment — air quality, water management, waste management and emergency response, public health, and adaptation planning. Multiple areas of interest can be chosen. In this example, the mayor indicates her community is concerned with the implications of “Sea-level Rise” for “Water Management.”

The ARC-X immediately provides information designed for her locale and specific concerns under the heading “Results Tailored to Your Interests.” The first item in the package addresses the foremost questions the mayor is likely to ask: Why should I care? Why does climate change matter for the things my community cares about? The system explains that climate change is causing sea levels to rise more rapidly across the country, amplifying the magnitude of storm surges in coastal areas. The storm surges could flood or damage water infrastructure that is located along the coast or tidally influenced water bodies. These threats will worsen over time as sea levels increase and the magnitude of storm surges increase.

One can imagine the mayor then asking, What can I do about it? What adaptation options exist that I might consider implementing? In response, the system provides a list of adaptation strategies from which she can choose. The mayor is introduced, for example, to the possibility of building flood barriers like levees, dikes, and seawalls; relocating the utility infrastructure to a higher elevation; developing coastal wetlands as buffers to storm surge; and retrofitting the facility with stronger pumps to prevent wastewater outlets from backflowing.

Since the ARC-X is non-prescriptive, the mayor must decide which, if any, adaptation strategies she is interested in implementing. Since her community’s wastewater treatment facility is already protected from flooding by a seawall, she would like to consider an adaptation option that would raise the wall (the ARC-X adaptation category she might choose is labeled “Plan for climate change: Integrate climate-related risks into capital improvement plans”).

At this point, the mayor is likely to ask the practical question, How can I do it? The ARC-X answers with case studies to demonstrate how other communities concerned with protecting coastal water infrastructure from sea-level rise have successfully implemented the adaptation option she has chosen.

One of the case studies might be the Blue Plains Wastewater Facility in Washington, D.C. The facility is vulnerable to flooding because it is located adjacent to the tidal Potomac River. The mayor learns that Blue Plains has also historically been protected from flooding by a seawall built to withstand a 1-in-100-year flood. She then discovers the local water and sewer authority has assessed the risks posed by sea-level rise and decided to raise the height of the wall. It is investing $13 million in the construction of a 17.2-foot-high sea wall that will surpass the recommended 1-in-500-year storm level. The construction project is due to be completed in 2021.

If the case study stopped here, it wouldn’t help the mayor understand how to replicate the steps taken by the wastewater authority to assess the vulnerability of the Blue Plains facility to sea-level rise and to determine an appropriate height for the sea wall. But the case studies in the ARC-X are different than case studies on other websites. The mayor discovers the ARC-X case study includes a “How did they do it?” section containing the key steps her community would have to take to replicate the actions being taken at the Blue Plains facility. The ARC-X then identifies specific tools available to implement each of the key steps, training materials to help the mayor’s staff understand how to use the tools, contact information for people at EPA who can answer any questions, and financial support available from EPA and other federal agencies to help defray costs.

Recall the ARC-X planning insights gained from the county executive who stated, “We don’t need any more stinkin’ tools.” In our example, the mayor in the Northeast along the coast who is facing flooding of her wastewater plant has been led by the portal to tools her community can use, along with technical support to understand how to use them, meeting the concern of the exasperated county executive. Indeed, all the material provided to the mayor is in non-technical terms. The website then provides links to more technical documentation that can be used by staff to whom the job of implementing the adaptation strategies will be delegated.

Looking ahead, EPA is expanding the number of case studies. A major source of new information will be the communities themselves as they increasingly adapt to the risks posed by climate change. A mechanism therefore exists within the ARC-X for communities to share their experiences and work with EPA to develop new case studies.

The agency recognizes the ARC-X is a nationwide system that lacks a lot of detailed case studies for any one state. EPA is therefore actively looking for opportunities to work with states to develop their own state-level versions of the portal that would contain more detailed content relevant to their communities. EPA is prepared to share the entire system (content and computer code) with states at no cost so they can use it as a platform for building their own state-level versions of the ARC-X. The first state-level version was launched by Indiana University last year. The school’s system, the Environmental Resilience Institute Toolkit, is tailored to the specific needs of communities in Indiana and the surrounding midwestern states.

EPA continues to enhance the ARC-X to make it useful to a wider base. A new component is being developed that focuses on the information needs of businesses. Climate change poses risks to the assets and operations of many businesses across the country, and can have adverse environmental and public health outcomes. Since businesses are important partners in state and local efforts to protect public health and the environment, empowering them to make more informed investments in climate adaptation is warranted.

The initial success of the ARC-X suggests its unique user interface and system for producing integrated packages of tailored information can be a model the designers of other adaptation websites may wish to adopt and adapt. Replication of the ARC-X approach could help enhance the usefulness of the huge volume of information about climate impacts and adaptation that is already available to the public. TEF

CENTERPIECE ❧ What can EPA do to help communities confront the impacts of climate change? Resilience and adaptation are the key words driving the agency's web-based portal that informs and empowers local decisionmakers as they encounter the environment of the future.

“Losing Earth” - The Golden Moment for Climate Change
Author
Oliver Houck - Tulane University
Tulane University
Current Issue
Issue
6

“For of all sad words of tongue or pen, The saddest are these: “It might have been!” — John Greenleaf Whittier

The saddest words of tongue or pen attend what happened with America and climate change. This is the thesis of Nathaniel Rich’s provocative history, published on line and as the sole article in its Sunday magazine with stark photos and considerable fanfare by the New York Times as “Losing Earth: The Decade We Almost Stopped Climate Change.” It is as well-grounded as any narrative today and it reads like a pop thriller, shaping a story that has already begun to reshape the world... the rest of the world be damned. For better or for worse, America owns this one.

Rich dispenses with what we know about climate change today in a prologue. It is a grim stage. In recent decades we hoped to arrest the phenomenon by 2020, then by 2050. As it now stands the odds of limiting a rise in global temperatures to 2 degrees Celsius are only 1 in 20, at which point the tropical reefs are extinct, sea levels are up several meters, and coastal development on every gulf is no longer tenable. That may be the best case. As the phenomenon hits 4 degrees from various feedback loops, we have Europe in permanent drought and entire subcontinents of desert, including the American southwest.

Although the vastness of these impacts is newly appreciated, their mechanics have been an open secret for a long time. Scientists were predicting global warming since the rise of industrial Europe over a century ago, coal emissions blackening households along the way and eating away at stone buildings. Today the greenhouse effect is found, as Rich writes, in any Introduction to Biology textbook (unless deleted by state agencies). To which America, with the world in tow, was at least facially responding... until suddenly it wasn’t. What happened?

The focus in this sense is narrow, from 1979, when American responses seemed on course, to l989, when, as if by wand, they went off the radar. Each succeeding chapter, as punchy as a short story, tracks a few major players and their pieces of the frame. They include Rafe Pomerance, a broadly skilled environmentalist who fell into the issue and never left it; James Hansen, the NASA scientist, quiet, unassuming, and deadly factual, who would become the bete-noir of climate change deniers; Al Gore, then in the House of Representatives, who made climate change the driver of his political life; John Sununu, President George H.W. Bush’s chief of staff, who had quite different ideas (including of his own expertise); industry chiefs and agency heads who saw threats to their missions; and the ever-present Office of Management and Budget, which went so far as to neuter Hansen’s testimony to Congress and then rewrite parts of it out of whole cloth. (Hansen would present the edited testimony and then reveal both the intervention and its inaccuracies — which caught headlines.) In short, a preview of the war and tactics that would dominate U.S. climate policy ever since.

Rich describes these events with wit and depth, but never quite answers his own question. Sifting through the narrative it seems to have been a perfect storm, unwittingly abetted by a blue-ribbon National Academy of Sciences panel asked to determine both what was happening and appropriate responses. True to the caution of their discipline, however, sensitive to the slightest unknown, after three hard days of dialogue its members could not even agree that the situation was “urgent,” only that it “could be.” Somewhere buried in their report were alarming data, but the take home was that science was working on it, and in any event nothing very bad was going to happen very soon. Which of course is what made the evening news. Ironically, an exercise intended to elevate the issue freed Americans to stop worrying about it instead and return to the backyard grill.

At the same time, throughout the 1980s President Reagan was making government a dirty word. For their part, the carbon industries, led by oil and gas, turned hostile to the issue as soon as it became apparent that they were in the bullseye and would be expected to change; changing the most profitable enterprises in the world was not exactly their business model. National leadership then fell to President Bush, who had apparently decided to put climate change into his campaign after seeing something about it in a magazine. When push came to shove, with his EPA urging action, he left the field to Sununu. As a colleague told Administrator William K. Reilly, “You can’t win against the White House,” and he didn’t. Exactly what lesson can be drawn here is rather opaque. What seemed extraordinary then, from testimony-tampering to quashed initiatives and pandering to Big Oil, seems par for the course today — even mild.

The blowback to this piece has been considerable. It was encouraged by the very title of its promo video, “Almost nothing stood in our way — except ourselves.” As if to confirm the we’re all to blame implications of this statement, Rich goes on in an epilogue to conclude: “It’s not the oil industry; it’s not Republicans, it’s not capitalism: it is all of us. It’s democracy. It’s the human species.” At which point he has exculpated even the most self-interested climate change deniers, and thrown up his hands. As the author Naomi Klein writes in a response to Rich in the Intercept, “Capitalism Killed Our Climate Momentum, Not ‘Human Nature.’” It is simply wrong to use the royal We to describe “a screamingly homogenous group of U.S. power players.” They, and not all that many of them, were at the controls, not us.

Another response entitled “How Not to Talk About Climate Change” also takes Rich to task for failing to pin the tail on the very donkeys identified in his piece. It was the oil industry, which had in fact begun undercutting climate initiatives at the same time Rich saw them on-board, and soon went viral with one of the most successful disinformation campaigns in American history; it was the Republicans under the lead of Sununu and, later, the second President Bush’s vice president, Dick Cheney, who made carbon fuels a national priority and labeled energy conservation an obstacle to progress; it was unregulated capitalism that rose to promethean heights in the 1980s, removing all obstacles in its way, and again in the 2000s, and again today. It was Grand Old Party politico-linguist Frank Luntz, who a few years later would advise party leaders on a winning strategy: as the science on climate change was closing in, they needed to inject uncertainty into the debate. “A compelling story, even if factually inaccurate,” he noted, “can be more emotionally compelling than a dry recitation of the truth.” Even if factually inaccurate — how prescient.

The fact is that U.S. action on climate change was not killed in the 1980s, and although Rich’s “golden moment” was lost, there was never reason to believe that meaningful responses would come easily, if at all. Indeed, it is all the more remarkable that U.S. initiatives survived and came back off the mat, twice, only to suffer setbacks equally abrupt and yet more bizarre. The first came in the 2000 election, in which the most visible and outspoken advocate for climate action on the national scene lost the presidency of the United States to a Supreme Court decision so tinged with politics and based on reasoning so flakey that we are admonished never to cite it as precedent.

The second came in 2015, when every nation on the planet, to even their own surprise, signed onto the Paris Agreement that set the stage for worldwide carbon reductions, only to run into a U.S. presidential candidate who claimed climate change a hoax and, with the aid of well-timed interventions from the Russian government and ill-timed statements from the FBI, would win office by a whisker later that year. Following which America has announced it will withdraw from the agreement and taken every step possible (some of questionable legality) to eliminate domestic climate change controls.

And yet, as an issue, it cannot die. California is on fire, the Southwest is already a dry canteen, Louisiana is sinking like a shipwreck, natural cycles have lost their clocks (as the Cree say, “The geese have lost their way”), and the big changes have yet to come. Rich has written a gripping narrative backgrounding this, and to be fair his epilogue alludes to much of it, but he ends with no more satisfactory an explanation than “human nature” — as if the strong positions taken on climate change in Europe, Latin America, and even Africa come from another species. Perhaps he, too, became overwhelmed by its enormity and ended up blaming all of us. “Losing Earth” is, nonetheless, a deep plunge and an important read. Rich is a gifted writer, but has he finished the job?

In his prologue, Rich calls the “inaugural chapter” of the climate change saga “Apprehension,” our understanding of the phenomenon. He identifies a second chapter called “The Reckoning,” the meaning of which is less clear. If it consists of a one-decade foray into what happened, then “Losing Earth” becomes, at journey’s end, simply a well-written lament. If, however. he means a reckoning of responsibility, then he has failed to close. One of these days a lawsuit is going to break through the impasse (current decisions notwithstanding, damage claims in tort and fraud are not “political questions”), or a state like California will (and it is trying), or a rising generation (also trying), or perhaps something as bizarre as what we have now going on in Washington, and I hope Rich is on hand to describe it. He is clearly primed.

To me, at the least a reckoning means people and institutions are taken to task. This has yet to happen. Until it happens, there will be no reckoning at all. “Losing Earth” is a great start, but blaming “human nature” doesn’t count.

Oliver Houck on "Losing Earth" in the 1980s.

The First Earthrise Launched an Era
Author
Stephen R. Dujack - Environmental Law Institute
Environmental Law Institute
Current Issue
Issue
6

The first Earthrise launched an era

Exactly 69 hours, 8 minutes, and 16 seconds after launch, the crew of Apollo 8 burned the spacecraft’s retro rockets while behind the far side of the Moon and out of contact with the Earth. That daring maneuver caused the capsule to enter lunar orbit. The craft circled the Moon three times. After the fourth pass behind the satellite, the three astronauts looked through their tiny glass port and became the first humans to witness an Earthrise.

Lunar Module Pilot William Anders took some photographs of the view in black and white, but he immediately realized the import of what he was seeing and called excitedly for a camera with color film. Command Module Pilot James Lovell passed him the Hasselblad and Anders took one of the most important photographs since the invention of the medium. It was Christmas Eve 1968.

That night 50 years ago, during a television broadcast that was at the time the most viewed in history, Commander Frank Borman announced that the crew had a message for the human race. Then each astronaut read in turn from the Creation Story in the Book of Genesis.

There was a poignancy that can’t be described to today’s interconnected world in hearing that scratchy transmission from a quarter of a million miles away, and the coincidence of the holy date and the tale of a universe coming into existence from nothingness to realize the awe of the harmoniously circling spheres created the perfect message for the first time that humanity had left its home planet.

Then when Apollo 8 returned to Earth and the film was developed, the import of the Earthrise image became apparent, leveraging on the broadcast of the opening verses of the Old Testament. It is safe to say that photograph helped to kick off the environmental era. One year after the lunar mission, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act. That same day, December 22, 1969, the Environmental Law Institute opened its doors.

Capturing the movement created by that photo, the essayist and medical doctor Lewis Thomas wrote about the view in the concluding chapter of his 1974 best seller The Lives of a Cell. The image makes sense of Thomas’s whole book. Lives makes the case that cells are collections of matter that work to perpetuate themselves — absorbing, storing, and using energy — and to produce new generations. Only from the vantage of another celestial body, however, is it apparent that the Earth too is self-perpetuating.

“Viewed from the distance of the Moon, the astonishing thing about the Earth, catching the breath, is that it is alive. The photographs show the dry, pounded surface of the Moon in the foreground, dead as an old bone. Aloft, floating free beneath the moist, gleaming membrane of bright blue sky is the rising Earth, the only exuberant thing in this part of the cosmos.”

Thomas notes that “it takes a membrane to make sense out of disorder in biology.” Just as a cell is protected by its membrane, “When the Earth came alive it began constructing its own membrane, for the general purpose of editing the sun.”

It happened in slow stages, as the rocky planet outgassed an atmosphere that proved hospitable for the first photosynthetic cells, which populated the surface with a veneer of green — the first biosphere. These cells produced an oxygen atmosphere with just enough carbon dioxide to cause a congenial greenhouse effect and serve as food for the plants that would later evolve.

In the upper reaches of the membrane, the oxygen is converted by sunlight into ozone, which in turn acts to shield the biosphere producing the oxygen from damaging ultraviolet radiation. Thus, the membrane edits energy to the benefit of the higher life forms that became possible, including of course the first animals and, eventually, environmental professionals.

“We are safe, well-ventilated, and incubated provided we can avoid technologies that might fiddle with that ozone, or shift the levels of carbon dioxide,” Thomas concludes. Chlorofluorocarbons were just becoming known to damage the ozone layer, leading to a phaseout in the 1987 Montreal Protocol. And the theory of climate change as the result of increased greenhouse gases was just getting launched, but within two decades the world had agreed to the 1992 UN climate convention and made more concrete steps in 1997 in Kyoto and 2015 in Paris.

When humanity realized how precious life is on our lonely blue-and-green rock, the reaction kicked off an era of legal interventions to protect the membrane we call the environment. A half century on, we’re still at it.

Notice & Comment is written by the editor and represents his views.

 

“Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan announced a lawsuit . . . against Trump International Hotel & Tower in Chicago, alleging it has violated environmental laws by dumping millions of gallons of water in the Chicago River daily without first conducting studies on the impact to the river’s fish, as federally mandated.”

Politico Morning Energy

 

Gender-balanced Boards Save Dollars in Environmental Penalties

Companies with a more balanced mix of men and women on their boards are better at protecting the environment and less likely to be sued for environmental law violations, according to new research from the University of Adelaide.

The study, published in the Journal of Corporate Finance, examined 1893 environmental lawsuits raised against the ‘Standard and Poor’s’ 1500 firms in the United States between 2000 and 2015 and identified direct links between gender diversity and corporate environmental violations.

The study found companies with greater gender diversity on their boards experienced significantly fewer environmental lawsuits, indicating that female directors contribute to reducing corporate environmental litigation. For example, for every female added to a board of directors in the sample, the average lawsuit exposure is reduced by 1.5%, which on an average environmental lawsuit (USD $204 million) could equate to a saving of USD $3.1 million.

The study’s author and Adelaide Business School Senior Lecturer, Dr Chelsea Liu says the explanation for the findings lies in gender socialisation and diversity theories. “Gender diversity is what’s important — female representation on boards is most important where the CEO is male, and less important if the CEO is female,” says Dr Liu.

AAAS Eureka Alert

 

Did Congress address climate change?

Whether the Clean Air Act, originally passed in 1970, can be applied to global warming was a matter of intense debate during the litigation leading up to the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision Massachusetts v. EPA, in which the justices ruled that if the agency determines greenhouse gases are dangerous, it is required to regulate them. Two years later, the Obama EPA issued an endangerment finding for carbon dioxide and other gases, which was followed by restrictions on emissions from mobile sources and, later, power plants.

Buried in the original 1970 legislation is the word climate, in a list of welfare conditions that concerned the lawmakers in writing the powerful statute. Climate change didn’t become a major issue till the 1980s and wasn’t determined to be a matter in the act’s ambit for another two decades after that. Could it be that the original drafters of the statute knew about an issue that wouldn’t become a public policy concern for more than a generation?

Tom Jorling served as minority counsel to the Senate Committee on Public Works and its Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution from 1968 through 1972. We asked him about this single word in the original legislation:

“The several years preceding the enactment of the 1970 act witnessed a rapid expansion of knowledge about the effects of air pollution. While much attention was given to the health effects in the committee, in Congress, in the media, and among interest groups there was growing awareness of broad-scale physical and chemical changes in the atmosphere as well as ecosystem effects as a result of air pollution. This was explicitly recognized in the act by including in its regulatory provisions, not just controlling health effects, but also abating effects on ‘welfare,’ defined to include ‘effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, man-made materials animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, climate . . . and personal comfort and well-being.’

“There was growing recognition that human activities involving the release of pollutants into the atmosphere was causing significant consequences for the biosphere. Some of the consequences brought early to the attention of the committee resulted from the documented fact that radionucleides from above-ground nuclear weapons testing were distributed through the atmosphere. Similarly, the DDT molecule was found in the tissue of every organism sampled throughout the Earth’s biosphere. There was increasing concern over the effects on precipitation patterns produced by the release of particulate matter, primarily from the combustion of fossil fuels.

“There was growing concern over the apparent increase in heating of the atmosphere, not just in the urban heat pockets that had been so well documented. Senators Edmund Muskie and John Sherman Cooper, primary authors of the 1970 act, attended, along with some committee staff, the 1968 Congressional Joint Colloquium on the Environment, where the atmospheric scientist Walter Orr Roberts described the warming consequences of packing the atmosphere with gases resulting from combustion of fossil fuels.

“The scientists demonstrated the adverse effects of atmospheric ozone, photochemically produced from air pollutants, on vegetation and crops. They expressed concern about the deposition downwind of industrial facilities of nitrogen, sulfur, and other compounds shown to cause landscape-scale ecosystem degradation.

“In short, there was widespread recognition that air pollutants, some known and others that would be revealed with more research, caused what the act called ‘welfare’ effects that were addressed by Congress in the regulatory structure of the 1970 act.”

Fifty years ago, Apollo 8’s “Earthrise” photo kicked off environmental era.

The Origins of Political Polarization and the Fractured Climate Dialogue
Author
Craig M. Pease - Scientist and Law Professor
Scientist and Law Professor
Current Issue
Issue
6
Craig M. Pease

Like a glass vase hitting the floor, our formerly cohesive and cooperative society is fracturing into diverse and sharply splintered parts. In the past, polarizing language seemed mostly to be confined to litigation and fringe groups. Now our political language and institutions, our financial, intellectual, and political elites, and the public all seem to be at odds.

The data bear this out. In its 2017 report “The partisan divide on political values grows even wider,” the Pew Research Center shows that the political positions of Republicans and Democrats on a range of issues broadly overlapped in 1994, but that by 2017 those positions had split into two quite distinct and nearly dichotomous camps. Gary Jacobson’s unpublished manuscript dated September 2018, and the references therein, document the diverse guises this polarization takes, thereby showing it to be a robust feature of today’s politics.

So too for environmental opinion. Aaron McCright and Riley Dunlap, in a 2011 article, document increasing polarization of the public’s views on climate change from 2001 to 2010. This has built up over decades; ponder the near unanimous support for the environmental statutes enacted in the 1970s, the weakly bipartisan support for the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, and the often vacuous posturing of environmental debates in today’s Congress.

As a scientist, I am driven to do more than just get caught up in all this, by adopting and arguing for the views of one particular group or another. I am curious as to the causes and mechanisms behind this political polarization — the why and the how. Alas, here matters become murky.

Part of the answer lies in human cognition and psychology. The brain quickly and subconsciously acts on emotions, and only slowly and consciously pursues rational thought. The proximate driver of polarization is often political messages that appeal not to reason, but emotion.

Part of the answer lies in sociology. There is a sociological element to environmental debate, action, and polarization — an entire audience applauds an advocate, or a group protests in a sit-in. Our individual words, ideas, and actions reverberate off those physically close to us, who then echo them back to us. Often, we humans act by mimicking a reflection of ourselves. For a marvelously instructive anecdote, see Dan Kahan’s 2012 Nature article describing climate change opinion in a barber shop.

Humans strive to conform. And not just to those with physical propinquity. We draw our opinions and positions from those we are close to, in words, intellect, and ideology.

Justin Farrell offers a fun glimpse into all this in his 2016 PNAS paper “Corporate funding and ideological polarization about climate change.” Therein he analyzes an immense data set of “contrarian” climate change texts containing some 39 million words, drawn from some 164 organizations (think tanks, grassroots organizations, etc.), involving over 4,000 individuals. At its core, the question he asks is: What words cluster together?

Using powerful computer language processing of these texts, Farrell identifies clusters of words often found together, and then shows that there are clusters of clusters, etc. Indeed, Farrell finds only four main clusters of clusters of clusters, which he roughly labels disputes over scientific evidence; public knowledge of climate change and Al Gore; state versus federal issues; and energy-company concerns. Farrell provides color commentary by labeling the clusters, yet those agglomerations are present naturally in the texts, not something Farrell arbitrarily imposed.

Farrell analyzed only contrarian texts. One could undertake a similar study for environmental nonprofits, or an even larger study of the entire immense data set of all climate change texts. I do not see this polarization as being the “fault” of climate deniers, climate advocates, or anyone else. It just is.

Farrell, and indeed the scientific literature generally, leave unanswered the question of what is driving this ever-increasing polarization. My hypothesis is that the over 7 billion humans on Earth are encountering real resource limitations and scarcity. There is increasingly not enough to go around, causing the breakdown of institutional structures that promote cooperation.

I fear that this political polarization is evidence we have transitioned to a world where our institutions are not strong enough to promote cooperation, and where each person and his or her close friends are just grabbing whatever resources they can, by whatever means. There are some instructive parallels in the downfall of the Roman Empire — first the barbarians trying to just grab some resources, and then the entire system eventually descending into the extreme political splintering of feudalism.

The origins of political polarization and the fractured climate dialogue.

Solar Control As Part of Mitigation Portfolio
Author
Simone Tilmes - National Center for Atmospheric Research
National Center for Atmospheric Research
Current Issue
Issue
6
Parent Article

Delayed actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will have irreversible effects on the planet’s ecosystem and on society. Some of these changes have already become apparent, including dying coral reefs, melting glaciers, and sea-level rise. Even with the most ambitious emission abatement efforts, permanent changes to the climate system are very likely unavoidable.

Enter geoengineering technologies, which could provide an opportunity to prevent temperatures from reaching critical limits. But besides developing a framework that governs geoengineering research and potential applications, we need a robust understanding of the benefits as well as the limitations and risks of different geoengineering proposals.

Two that are getting the most attention of late are carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere and solar radiation management. While the development of CDR technologies has gained support in recent years, relatively little work has been done to explore SRM options which, moreover, lack significant R&D funding. In particular, there seems to be a misconception that SRM research would distract from emissions-abatement efforts. Further, unlike CDR, it may pose too many risks — a conclusion which ironically is a consequence of the limited understanding and development of these technologies.

If society instead decides to explore SRM options, decisionmakers can make better judgments as to whether they should become an important element of the global mitigation portfolio. Indeed, SRM may provide an opportunity in the future to reduce some of the suffering in case abatement efforts and CDR will not be sufficient.

The full effect of global SRM applications can only be tested using comprehensive Earth-system models. Such testing demonstrates that global solar reduction through enhancing of stratospheric aerosols is the most effective geoengineering approach to reach global temperature targets. However, since this application changes the Earth’s energy balance, it will not result in the restoration of past climate conditions and could in fact produce unfortunate regional climate shifts and other side effects.

So far, scientists have mostly explored the effects of global SRM using idealized modeling experiments. These often do not result in realistic outcomes in terms of impacts and side effects but have been an important first step in increasing the scientific understanding of physical changes to the atmosphere. More recent modeling has demonstrated that some side effects from earlier experiments can be reduced by applying newly derived strategies.

Continued research in this direction is promising and could provide a more robust understanding of benefits and impacts. For this, Earth-system scientists and engineers need to work with ecologists, social scientists, and economists to optimize strategies that would help society determine whether these technologies should be considered. International engagement rather than work performed by single actors would likely produce the best results.

The amount and timing of potentially implementing SRM are still unknown and presumably dependent on assumptions about future emissions of greenhouse gases. Ideally, limited SRM could be temporarily phased in and phased out to reduce a projected peak in global warming in order to prevent irreversible climate changes from happening until emissions abatement and CDR efforts have taken effect. However, since SRM would then be masking the warming from greenhouse gases still in the atmosphere, it may create a false sense of security and thereby promote the continued use of fossil fuels. A continued rise of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere would result in a prolonging of the application, with more risks and side effects.

In particular, potential interruptions of very large SRM applications would force temperatures to bounce back up at dangerously fast rates. Additional risks of SRM applications could arise from feedback in the climate system that triggers unexpected reactions, requiring much larger or smaller applications than expected.

The conclusion is clear. Society needs to work hard at continually improving climate models as well as gathering observational data to increase confidence in projections and to reduce the risks of the unknowns of inaction countered against the unknowns — and knowns — of geoengineering strategies. Potentially safe and effective amounts of SRM under different future climate scenarios have yet to be developed.

Global solar geoengineering approaches may become an important addition to other efforts to help reduce future climate impacts. Scientists will need to design SRM strategies that will produce the desired mitigation with minimal side effects — and with international approval. However, only binding international targets to ensure the rapid and complete phase-out of greenhouse gas emissions is needed to prevent long-term dependency on geoengineering and artificial interference with the climate system.

It’s Smart Risk Management and a Political Investment
Author
Cynthia Scharf - C2G2/Carnegie Climate Geoengineering Governance Initiative
C2G2/Carnegie Climate Geoengineering Governance Initiative
Current Issue
Issue
6
Parent Article

When I speak to audiences about geoengineering, I often start by saying I wish my job never existed. There would be no need to inform and encourage governments to create international guardrails around emerging climate technologies because decades ago my generation had taken care of job number one: radical, immediate decarbonization and strengthened adaptation.

Alas, that’s not the world we live in. Even at current levels of warming, climate change impacts are devastating, as we saw last summer, especially for those who did least to contribute to the problem but suffer first and worst from its effects. The longer the anemic global response to the climate crisis, the greater the pressure to deploy large-scale carbon removal, and potentially even solar geoengineering, to reduce dangerous climate impacts.

These technologies could potentially provide significant, if unequal, benefits if governed in an inclusive, just, and transparent manner. But they also pose critical environmental and geopolitical risks — known and unknown. Geoengineering will affect every country, hence all countries — and all sectors of society — need a say in how it is governed.

In speaking with governments and civil society organizations, it is abundantly clear we do not know enough about the risks, costs, and potential benefits of these technologies. Nor are we doing near enough to address how we might govern them in an equitable, accountable manner.

Several international agreements have potential relevance for geoengineering, but at present there is no systematic set of international frameworks. This needs to change —now.

We need a society-wide discussion about how to govern these technologies, before events overtake our ability to respond in an informed way. Indeed, this could be one of the most important conversations any government and civil society leader has in coming years.

To do so is not to abdicate responsibility for reducing emissions. Rather, it’s smart risk management and a wise political investment in a safer world.

Effective governance should be grounded in the precautionary principle and be inclusive, transparent, and equitable. It also should be developed in parallel with research, so the latter informs the former. Large-scale carbon removal and solar geoengineering will require multilateral governance, as both entail transboundary risks and challenges and could affect all countries, if unequally, creating global winners and losers.

Current UN bodies, primarily the climate convention, are appropriate for governing carbon removal at the multilateral level. National and sub-national governance also will play a key role. Solar geoengineering, however, poses thornier challenges. No existing institution covers the full range of issues that might arise. A polycentric approach will be needed, since the world evidences no appetite for creating new multinational institutions in the current political atmosphere. Existing institutions could include the UN Environment Assembly, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the General Assembly, and regional bodies.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s recent report makes clear that the world will need tremendous amounts of carbon removal in coming decades to avoid runaway climate change. Are existing climate convention mechanisms, including Paris, sufficient to address the full range of issues that may arise? These include land use, storage, liability, and compensation as well as responsibility, monitoring and reporting, and impacts on the Sustainable Development Goals. Equity and political responsibility are also key. Governments will need to cooperate on technology, funding, and the policy and market mechanisms that can make those technologies that have a social license to operate viable.

Even with a massive ramp up, it may not be possible to remove enough carbon in time to keep global temperatures from breaching danger points. Some countries might then consider solar geoengineering. At best, it might buy the world some time.

But who would be making the decisions to use this powerful technology? Whose hand will set the global thermostat? Under whose authority and with what political legitimacy? How, when, and under what circumstances? Political, as well as profound ethical and moral issues, are in play.

The world needs rules of the road to stop anyone –—a government or even a non-state actor — from testing and deploying solar geoengineering unless the risks and potential benefits are sufficiently understood, and international governance frameworks are agreed and in place. Absent this, the world would be faced with environmental and geo-political risks that could affect current and all future generations.

The era of risk-free options is past. Three years after Paris, there is a grave risk in assuming that our present tools — emission cuts and removals of small amounts of carbon dioxide — may be enough. It is critical that society as a whole wake up and weigh in on how geoengineering should be governed. The voices of the poor and marginalized, as well as faith communities, are essential to this discussion.

Governments need to learn more about geoengineering and put it on their shortlist of priorities. It is up to them to create the international guardrails that can help the world stay safer in a climate-chaotic future. The stakes could not be higher.

Assess Proposals in the Context of Climate Risks
Author
Edward A. Parson - UCLA Emmett Institute on Climate Change and the Environment
UCLA Emmett Institute on Climate Change and the Environment
Current Issue
Issue
6
Parent Article

The risks climate change poses to human societies and ecosystems are severe. Yet pursuit of cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions has stalled for so long that it is probably too late for emissions cuts alone to limit risks to acceptable levels. This stark reality provides essential context for all discussion of the potential contributions, costs, and risks of geoengineering.

Human activities have already heated the Earth by 1ºC, bringing impacts whose severity grows clearer each year. The 2015 Paris Agreement adopted targets to limit heating to 1.5 to 2ºC, but current policies and actions are far too weak to achieve these. Absent much stronger action, the Earth is headed for 2.5 to 5ºC heating this century, bringing likely disruption to lives, livelihoods, and ecosystems at a scale human societies have never experienced.

Stopping climate change requires cutting emissions to zero. Stopping it near the Paris targets requires cutting to zero within a few decades. This means going from today’s 80 percent reliance on fossil energy to a fully decarbonized economy, plus profound changes to eliminate emissions from agriculture, forestry, and other land-use, and multiple industrial processes.

Some models say 2ºC is still technically feasible, but only with multiple favorable assumptions, including rapid emission cuts starting immediately, low global energy demand, and fortunate outcomes on major scientific uncertainties. This doesn’t mean deep emissions cuts aren’t essential, or that they can’t reduce coming climate change risks: they are, and they can. But today’s efforts are probably fighting to reduce heating of as much as 5ºC to maybe 2.5ºC, still more than the Paris goals.

If this situation is unacceptably dangerous but emissions cuts can’t do much better, what can be done? This question is the reason to discuss geoengineering. It might be able to substantially reduce climate risks. It also presents new risks and challenges, including potentially serious problems of governance. Whether these problems are manageable or severe, they must be considered in the context of the risks of climate change.

The two main geoengineering approaches have different profiles of benefits and risks. One approach removes CO2 from the atmosphere and puts it in some stable reservoir. Proposed methods range from large expansion of familiar forest or soil-conservation practices, to novel chemical methods of direct air capture. Specific methods differ in state of development, potential scale and limits, and environmental and socioeconomic impacts, but have two things in common. First, they act slowly: sucking CO2 out of the atmosphere is draining a swimming pool through a straw. Second, if done at large enough scale they can make net emissions negative and thus reduce atmospheric CO2, not just slow its increase, and so run climate change backwards.

The second approach, solar geoengineering, would reflect away a little incoming sunlight to change the Earth’s energy balance. Promising methods include spraying reflective mist in the upper atmosphere, and making low-level ocean clouds denser and whiter. Unlike carbon removal, this approach does not target the cause of climate change, but instead makes an offsetting change. It is thus an imperfect, incomplete correction for greenhouse-driven climate change, but it has the unique advantage that it can be started, controlled, or stopped over time periods of a year or less. It would also bring its own impacts and risks. Early research suggests the most obvious impacts are surprisingly moderate and potentially correctable, but this is far from a clean bill of health.

Neither approach can replace efforts to cut emissions and adapt to coming climate changes. These both remain essential. But both approaches can complement these to further reduce climate risks. Both need research to characterize how and how well they could work, what risks they would carry, and how these could be mitigated. Both also need serious consideration of how to develop needed capacity for governance, able to make competent, prudent, and legitimate decisions on whether and how they are used, to manage associated impacts and conflicts, and to integrate them into an effective overall climate strategy.

Neither approach is getting the serious investigation and critical scrutiny it needs, but in nearly opposite ways. Assumptions of enormous future carbon removals have quietly become a mainstay of climate planning, heavily relied on in nearly all 1.5 and 2ºC scenarios, with little examination of feasibility, limits, or impacts. Solar geoengineering has been marginalized in climate assessments and policy debates, based on presumptions of severe harm or impairment of climate policy that have also received inadequate research or critical scrutiny.

This has to change. To bet the future on carbon removal working at the required billion-ton scale with acceptable impacts is a reckless gamble. To exclude solar geoengineering from consideration based on untested intuitions that it would be a cure worse than the disease is equally reckless. For all their challenges, these approaches may make things less bad than they otherwise will be, for human society, for vulnerable people and communities, and for ecosystems.

Transparency Needed for Public Trust Globally
Author
Arunabha Ghosh - Council on Energy, Environment, and Water
Council on Energy, Environment, and Water
Current Issue
Issue
6
Parent Article

The world remains on track for more than 3°C of average warming by 2100. That will trigger calls for drastic measures to combat a climate emergency, including carbon removal from the atmosphere or solar radiation management. Geoengineering urgently needs governance — and transparency lies at its heart.

Undeveloped or untested geoengineering technologies are likely to have impacts on rainfall, the hydrological cycle, tropical forests, the ozone layer, and the oceans. Uncertainties abound about the shock if solar geoengineering were deployed at scale and then stopped suddenly. The risk of unilateral action worries those unable to regulate independent scientists, or any country or alliances who choose to experiment or possibly deploy measures. Even if global average temperature were to be controlled, how could responsibility be assigned and liabilities imposed for adverse regional consequences?

There are also ethical concerns about intentions and legitimacy. By reducing incentives to mitigate emissions, geoengineering potentially creates a moral hazard. There is a related worry that investments in research could build momentum down a slippery slope toward deployment. Another concern is the difficulty in ascertaining intent behind geoengineering research or deployment. The ostensible reason could be a response to climate emergencies. But adversely impacted countries or regions would claim a legitimate right to verify if there were malafide intentions. The legitimacy of any experiment or deployment would rest on who has a say over how transborder impacts are assessed.

The long list of risks and uncertainties generates the demand for regulating geoengineering. Answering these concerns implies that research must continue. But effective outdoor research may require large-scale testing, bordering on deployment. Imposing a moratorium only on deployment while permitting research would be challenging to enforce. Thus, not just deployment but also research needs to fall within the ambit of governance.

Transparency must occupy a central role in geoengineering governance. But toward what end? Transparency is needed to minimize public risk. Impacts at a planetary scale need governance arrangements that are more risk-averse than for technologies that have limited physical impacts. In the absence of national or international regulation, a code of conduct for geoengineering research could serve as a stop-gap to control public risks, until more formal governance mechanisms are established. Information on research proposals, risk assessments, and disclosure of research results would be essential components of such a code.

Transparency is also needed to build public trust. This is critical to the sequential unfolding of research stages, from laboratory to field research to large experiments. Academic networks and peer-reviewed journals are insufficient to effectively communicate scientific findings to the public. Research registries might contribute to building trust but cannot replace political processes. National scientific assessments and public and parliamentary hearings would be necessary to effectively engage the public about geoengineering, within the broader context of climate responses.

In order to make transparency work for geoengineering, it has to be institutionalized, not ad hoc. A well-designed information system would perform three functions: disseminating information about national policies and research activities; promoting compliance with codes of conduct via peer pressure among research groups, member countries, explicit sanctions, or pressure from non-state actors; and evaluating the impact of geoengineering research and experiments.

Self-reporting is the most efficient way to disseminate but carries the risk that some information might come too late for regulation. Eventually, there should be mandatory state-to-state disclosure, via a globally negotiated agreement, to empower countries to make informed choices. Moreover, legitimate public engagement requires a bidirectional flow of information between project proponents and stakeholders. It can be long, hard, and sometimes inconclusive, but would be a necessary step in enforcing compliance with codes of conduct.

For overall assessments of geoengineering activities, progressively inclusive governance could be pursued. It would begin with national assessments and national-level consultations to yield governance and transparency templates for different stages of research and experimentation. Thereafter, national policies on geoengineering could be reported to international forums. A combination of government and nongovernmental entities could coordinate for independent peer reviews and international consultations. Accordingly, international assessments of the progress and risks of geoengineering research could be conducted in select multilateral forums.

If these steps increase public trust and minimize risks, an international geoengineering research program could be envisaged, taking account of research capacities, funding, intellectual property, and rules for accountability and liability. Without transparency, there will be more contestation. With transparency, conditions of distrust could be marginally abated.

The Time for Abatement Alone Is Passing Us By — Should Humanity Consider Geoengineering?
Author
Arunabha Ghosh - Council on Energy, Environment, and Water
Edward A. Parson - UCLA Emmett Institute on Climate Change and the Environment
Cynthia Scharf - C2G2/Carnegie Climate Geoengineering Governance Initiative
Simone Tilmes - National Center for Atmospheric Research
Council on Energy, Environment, and Water
UCLA Emmett Institute on Climate Change and the Environment
C2G2/Carnegie Climate Geoengineering Governance Initiative
National Center for Atmospheric Research
Current Issue
Issue
6
The Time for Abatement Alone Is Passing Us By — Should Humanity Consider Geoengi

Scientists have begun to hedge their bets and not count on society decarbonizing in time to avoid disruption to the Earth’s climate system. Even if the dreams of the Paris Agreement are fully realized, the planet may become uncomfortably warm in the near term, bringing severe conditions. Consider current events.

Houston has been hit with two 500-year rainstorms this decade alone. The American West has turned into a tinderbox, with water running out and wildfires devastating populated areas every summer. Miami along with a lot of the rest of southern Florida is slowly slipping into the sea. Russian cargo ships are sailing from Vladivostok to Europe by way of an ice-free Arctic Ocean.

Enter a once-taboo topic shunned by greens and governments alike — geoengineering, a suite of technological remedies to solve the climate crisis or at least buy humanity more time to rid our energy and agricultural systems of greenhouse gas emissions. AT&T’s Braden Allenby wrote about such intervention in these pages 18 years ago. In “Global Warning,” he declared that international efforts at emissions abatement were doomed to failure and that “society should actively manage the entire carbon cycle, using a broad array of technologies and policies to achieve climate stabilization.” What seemed like science fiction then has become today’s unfortunate reality.

The proposals are as diverse as they are serious. One of the most-touted solutions is to reflect incoming solar radiation, perhaps by injecting sulfur particles into the upper atmosphere. Or water droplets injected into clouds could make them more reflective. Another method would attempt to increase heat leaving the Earth by seeding the atmosphere with particles to thin high cirrus clouds that block energy outflow. Engineers have even suggested a huge mirror in solar orbit that would reflect a significant percentage of the sun’s incoming heat.

Other possibilities revolve around removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, which can be accomplished through engineering techniques or even seeding the oceans with iron to cause algae blooms that sequester carbon on the seabed. More naturally, planting trees locks up carbon, and silicate rocks can be granulated to enhance their uptake of atmospheric carbon.

All well and good, but scientists are also aware that these techniques could play havoc with the planet’s natural systems, disrupting flows of energy and elements that are vital to habitability. In addition, effects may perhaps worsen some conditions, and may be uneven, creating winners and losers. These unpredictable downside risks as well as climate-saving opportunities imply some sort of international body to manage geoengineering, but society has had some bad experiences in regulating technologies of much less consequence.

Is geoengineering necessary? What techniques will be the most successful while minimizing risks? And who will answer these questions and begin any needed interventions in the Earth’s climate system?

Scientists around the world have begun to hedge their bets and not count on society’s decarbonizing in time to avoid disruption to the Earth’s climate. Enter a once-taboo topic shunned by greens and governments alike — geoengineering, a suite of suggested technological remedies to solve the climate crisis or at least buy humanity more time to rid its energy and agricultural systems of greenhouse gas emissions.